









We study the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms in general dynamic environments
where information arrives gradually over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. Our
￿rst main result is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an
envelope formula for the derivative of an agent￿ s equilibrium expected payo⁄ with respect to his
current type. It combines the familiar marginal e⁄ects of types on payo⁄s with novel marginal
e⁄ects of current types on future ones captured by the ￿impulse response functions.￿The envelope
formula yields an expression for dynamic virtual surplus which is instrumental to the design of
optimal mechanisms and to the study of the dynamics of distortions under such mechanisms.
We construct transfers that guarantee that the formula is satis￿ed at all histories and qualify
in what sense they are pinned down by the allocation rule (￿revenue equivalence￿ ). Our second
main result is a characterization of PBE-implementable allocation rules in Markov environments,
which yields su¢ cient conditions that are applicable also to some non-Markov environments. We
illustrate the results by applying them to the design of novel mechanisms for the sale of experience
goods (￿bandit auctions￿ ).
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: D82, C73, L1.
Keywords: asymmetric information, stochastic processes, incentives, mechanism design, envelope
theorems
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We consider the design of incentive-compatible mechanisms in a dynamic environment in which
agents receive private information over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. The
model allows for a ￿nite or in￿nite horizon, for serial correlation of the agents￿private information,
as well as for the dependence of this information on past allocations. For example, it covers as special
cases such problems as the allocation of private and public goods to agents whose valuations follow
a stochastic process, the procedures for selling new experience goods to consumers who re￿ne their
valuations upon consumption, the design of multi-period procurement auctions for bidders whose
costs evolve stochastically over time and may exhibit learning-by-doing e⁄ects, and the design of
optimal dynamic taxes for workers whose productivity evolves over time.
A fundamental di⁄erence between dynamic and static mechanism design is that, in the former,
an agent has access to a lot more potential deviations. Namely, instead of a simple misrepresentation
of his true type, the agent can make this misrepresentation conditional on the information he has
observed in the mechanism, in particular on his past types, his past reports (which need not have
been truthful), and his past allocations (from which he can make inferences about other agents￿types
and allocations). Despite the resulting complications, we deliver general necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for incentive compatibility, and then show how to use these conditions to characterize
optimal (pro￿t-maximizing) mechanisms in applications.
We consider a multi-agent environment in which the stochastic processes governing the evolu-
tion of the agents￿types are independent of one another, except through their dependence on the
allocations observed by the agents. This assumption is a proper extension of the familiar ￿Indepen-
dent Types￿assumption for static mechanism design to the dynamic setting, and prevents the full
extraction of the agents￿surplus ￿ la Cremer and McLean (1988).
The cornerstone of our analysis is the derivation (and validation) of an envelope formula for
the derivative of an agent￿ s equilibrium expected payo⁄ with respect to his private information
in any Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism.1 Similarly to Mirrlees￿￿rst-order approach for
static environments (Mirrlees, 1971), this formula provides an envelope condition summarizing local
incentive-compatibility constraints. Intuitively, the envelope formula represents the impact of an
(in￿nitesimal) change in the agent￿ s current type on his equilibrium expected payo⁄. It accounts
both for the familiar direct e⁄ect of the current type on the agent￿ s utility, as well as for the impact
that all future types have on the utility, weighted by the e⁄ect that the current type has on the type
distribution in each of the subsequent periods, which is both direct and indirect through its impact
on the distribution of types in intermediate periods. All these stochastic e⁄ects are summarized
in an impulse response function that describes the e⁄ect of the current type on all future ones by
1Even though the focus here is on mechanism design, the derived envelope formula may be useful also for stochastic
programming problems in other contexts.
1representing future types as a combination of the current type, of the decisions taken over time,
and of independent shocks. As for the current type￿ s e⁄ects through the agent￿ s messages to the
mechanism, the formula ignores them, by the usual envelope theorem logic.
The di¢ culty in establishing that this envelope formula is a necessary condition for incentive
compatibility in all Bayesian mechanisms comes from the fact that the usual conditions for an
envelope theorem (such as those in Milgrom and Segal (2002)) are rarely satis￿ed in a dynamic
setting. To see the substantive problem, consider a deviation in which the agent misreports his
current type and then reports truthfully from the next period onwards. Equivalently, one can think
of the future types as being observed and reported by di⁄erent agents. But then, according to Cremer
and McLean (1988), the correlation between current and future types would allow full extraction of
the agent￿ s surplus, in which case revenue equivalence would clearly fail and the agent￿ s payo⁄would
not satisfy the envelope formula. The technical manifestation of the problem is that, in dynamic
mechanisms, the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ is not well-behaved in the current type for several possible
strategies, even if his underlying utility function and the kernels are smooth in types.
We circumvent the problem by focusing on a carefully chosen subset of strategies that still includes
truthtelling (which must be an optimal strategy in an incentive-compatible mechanism) and for which
the expected payo⁄can be guaranteed to be well-behaved in the current type, under some appropriate
primitive conditions which we identify in the paper. This subset is obtained by representing the type
processes by means of serially independent shocks, and then restricting the agents to report the
subsequent shocks truthfully (which amounts to a particular restriction on the set of strategies in the
primitive representation).2 We then derive our dynamic envelope formula by imposing, in addition
to the usual assumptions of di⁄erentiability and equi-Lipschitz continuity of the utility functions in
types, appropriate bounds on the impulse response functions (which bound the dependence of future
types on the current type).
Next we show how the dynamic envelope formula can be used in a quasilinear environment to ex-
press the principal￿ s expected payo⁄in any incentive-compatible and individually-rational mechanism
as the expected ￿virtual surplus,￿appropriately de￿ned for the dynamic setting.3 This derivation uses
only the dynamic envelope formula and the participation constraints of the agents￿lowest types in
the initial period. The derivation yields the dynamic ￿Relaxed Program,￿which consists of maximiz-
ing the expected virtual surplus while ignoring all the other incentive and participation constraints.
2This approach was ￿rst applied to a dynamic mechanism design problem by Eso and Szentes (2007). While they use
this approach to study the optimality of disclosure policies in auctions, here we use this approach to identify primitive
conditions under which our envelope formula is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility.
3Throughout the paper, we focus on quasilinear environments. However, all our conditions for incentive compatibility
apply more generally to those settings where the agents￿utility from the payments they receive is independent of their
private information, as in the Mirrlees optimal taxation problem or in most of the managerial compensation literature. It
su¢ ces to reinterpret the "payments" to the agents as the "monetary utility the agents derive from their compensation."
2(In general, the Relaxed Program is a stochastic dynamic programming problem.) In particular,
the Relaxed Program yields a simple intuition for the dynamics of distortions in pro￿t-maximizing
mechanisms: these distortions are introduced to reduce the agents￿expected surplus, as computed at
the time of contracting (i.e., when the participation constraints must be satis￿ed).4 However, due to
the serial correlation of the stochastic type processes, the principal distorts the agents￿consumption
choices not only in the ￿rst period, but also in any subsequent period in which the agent￿ s type is
responsive to the ￿rst-period type, as measured by the impulse response functions.
Our analysis demonstrates that the dynamics of distortions is determined by the dynamics of
the impulse responses (and not by other properties of the type process, such as serial correlation, as
suggested in previous work). This insight sheds light on what drives the qualitative di⁄erences across
the special cases studied in the literature. It also reveals that, contrary to what has been obtained
in such special cases, in general distortions need not be monotone in either the current or past types
and need not decline with time.
Studying the Relaxed Program is clearly satisfactory only insofar as the allocation rule that
solves this program can be shown to be implementable in a mechanism that guarantees partici-
pation and truthful reporting by all agents. Thus, we proceed to provide su¢ cient conditions for
implementability of a given choice rule, not just in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, but also in a Perfect-
Bayesian Equilibrium (and, in some cases, in an equilibrium that is robust to the agents￿observation
of other agents￿reports or types). For this purpose, we ￿rst construct payments that guarantee
that the equilibrium payo⁄s satisfy the envelope formula in every period. In fact, we show that
the net-present-value (NPV) of such payments is often ￿essentially￿unique, which extends the sta-
tic ￿revenue-, or more precisely, payo⁄-equivalence￿result to the dynamic setting. Namely, with a
single-agent, the allocation rule pins down the NPV of the payments in each state up to a state-
independent constant. With many agents, the envelope conditions pin down the expectation (over
the other agents￿types) of the NPV of the payments to each agent as a function of his own types.5
Next, we identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an allocation rule to be implementable
in the PBE of a direct mechanism in which all agents follow a ￿strongly truthful￿strategy. These
strategies prescribe truthtelling at all histories, even those involving past lies. The focus on strongly
truthful strategies is clearly restrictive, since in general an agent who lied in the past may ￿nd
it optimal to keep lying. Yet, this focus is justi￿ed for Markov environments (where the agents￿
true past type history does not a⁄ect current and future incentives), and also for some speci￿c
non-Markov environments. For such environments, we use or envelope formula to derive a dynamic
￿integral-monotonicity￿condition on the allocation rule, which is both necessary and su¢ cient for
4While we do not impose participation constraints in periods other than the initial one, in most applications of
interest, the payments we propose guarantee participation also in subsequent periods.
5As explained in due course, this stronger version of revenue equivalence is of special interest in those settings where
the agents￿utility is non linear in the payments but separable from the agents￿private information.
3truthtelling to be optimal at any history. In essence, this condition states that a one-stage upward lie
from the true type ￿t to the reported type ^ ￿t > ￿t increases the integral￿ over the interval [￿t;^ ￿t]￿ of
the partial derivative of the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ with respect to his true current type, while a
one-stage downward lie decreases the integral. The partial derivative (both under truthtelling and
under the lie) are calculated using our dynamic envelope formula.
We ￿rst use the integral-monotonicity condition to establish the suboptimality of one-stage devi-
ations from strong truthtelling and then extend this result to potentially in￿nitely lasting deviations
by establishing an appropriate one-stage deviation principle for this setting.6 Our analysis of the
one-stage deviations has a natural connection to static problems, for which recent work by Carbajal
and Ely (2010) and Berge, M￿ller, and Naeemi (2010) has characterized incentive compatibility in
terms of an analogous condition.
The integral-monotonicity condition plays a similar role to its counterpart in static environments
with multidimensional types and allocations: it is a necessary and su¢ cient condition that guarantees
that a single lie in anyone of the dimensions (in the dynamic environment, a one-step deviation from
truthtelling) is not pro￿table for the agent. As in the static case, due to the high dimensionality
of the problem, this condition need not be simple to verify. We therefore proceed by providing
various stronger conditions which, while not necessary, are easier to verify in applications. For
example, we show that when the type transitions are independent of the allocations and satisfy ￿rst-
order stochastic dominance, and the payo⁄s are supermodular, the integral-monotonicity condition
is guaranteed by the monotonicity of the allocation rule in each of the reports (strong monotonicity)
or by a weaker ex-post monotonicity property that, heuristically, requires that, in each state, the
intertemporal weighted average of each agent￿ s consumption choices be nondecreasing in the agent￿ s
reports. These monotonicity conditions also ensure that, for appropriately constructed payments,
the agents have no incentives to lie even if they were allowed to observe the other agents￿types ￿
past, current, and even future ones ￿ in which case the entire execution of the mechanism can be
fully disclosed to the agents without a⁄ecting their incentives.
We also identify su¢ cient conditions on the primitives of the problem that guarantee that the
allocation rule solving the relaxed program is indeed strongly monotone. While these conditions are
satis￿ed in most of the applications considered in the literature, there are interesting problems (such
as our leading application described below) that naturally violate these conditions. When this is
the case, the integral-monotonicity condition can be established by checking that the allocation rule
satisfy a weaker form of monotonicity (average monotonicity) that only requires that the intertem-
poral weighted average of each agent￿ s consumption choices be nondecreasing in the agent￿ s reports,
on average across states, as opposed to state-by-state as in the case of ex-post monotonicity. We
6The validity of the one-stage deviation principle in our environment does not follow from previous results because
the payo⁄s need not be continuous at in￿nity (e.g., the ￿ ow payo⁄s need not be bounded).
4use this condition, for example, in our leading application, where multiple buyers compete in each
period for the provision of a good in ￿xed supply and where valuations are re￿ned endogenously
upon consumption. We show how the design of a pro￿t-maximizing mechanism for this environment
can be recast as a virtual multi-armed bandit problem whose solution is a ￿bandit auction￿that
allocates the good in each period to the buyer with the highest virtual Gittins index. In the context
of this application, weak monotonicity boils down to requiring that, by submitting a higher bid in
the current period, the bidder expects to reduce the waiting time prior to his next consumption,
a property that is naturally satis￿ed by the virtual index allocation rule that solves the relaxed
program.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We wrap up this section by brie￿ y discussing the
related literature. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3 characterizes necessary conditions
for the implementability of an allocation rule as a BNE of a mechanism and establishes our dynamic
envelope formula. Section 4 contains the relaxed program, it shows how to use the dynamic envelope
formula to represent the principal￿ s payo⁄as dynamic virtual surplus, and examines the dynamics of
distortions under pro￿t-maximization. Section 5 shows how to construct payments that guarantee
that the equilibrium payo⁄s satisfy the necessary envelope conditions after each history, it derives
conditions under which such payments are essentially unique (revenue equivalence), and ￿nally iden-
ti￿es necessary and su¢ cient conditions for PBE (and periodic ex-post) implementability. Section 6
contains concluding remarks. All proofs omitted in the main text are in the Appendix at the end of
the manuscript.
1.1 Related Literature
Some of the results in the paper have precedents in the literature, in the context of speci￿c settings.
A key contribution of the present paper is a general approach that uni￿es the existing literature, helps
explain what drives the di⁄erences in the preceding papers and facilitates novel applications. This
general approach also clari￿es which of the previous ￿ndings were general and which ones depended
on the speci￿c settings being considered.
The literature on dynamic mechanism design goes back to the pioneering work of Baron and
Besanko (1984), who used the ￿rst-order approach in a two-period single-agent setting to derive an
optimal mechanism for regulating a natural monopoly. They characterized optimal distortions using
an ￿informativeness measure,￿which is a two-period version of our impulse response formula (see
also Riordan and Sappington (1987)). More recently, Courty and Li (2000) considered a similar
7For other applications of our approach, see (i) the family of time-separable problems where payo⁄s separate over
time (as in sequential procurement auctions and regulation) and where the ￿ ow payo⁄s are possibly governed by a
non-Markov process of Section 5.3, (ii) the managerial compensation problems in Garrett and Pavan (2011,a,b), and
(iii) the analysis of repeated bargaining by Skrzypacz and Toikka (2012).
5model to study optimal advanced ticket sales. They also provided some su¢ cient conditions for a
dynamic (two-period) allocation rule to be implementable.8 Our paper builds on some of the ideas
in these papers, extending them to a setting with an arbitrary (possibly in￿nite) number of periods,
multiple agents, and more general payo⁄s and type processes.9 Furthermore, as mentioned above, in
contrast to these early papers, we provide conditions in terms of the primitives of the environment
that validate the envelope formula in the ￿rst-order approach as a necessary condition for incentive
compatibility.
Besanko (1985) and Battaglini (2005) characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent whose
type follows an in￿nite-horizon Markov process. While Besanko (1985) considers an AR(1) process
with a continuum of states, Battaglini (2005) considers a two-state Markov process. The qualitative
results in these two papers are quite di⁄erent: while in Besanko (1985) the allocation in each period
depends only on the agent￿ s initial and current type and is downward distorted at each ￿nite history
with probability one, in Battaglini (2005) once the agent￿ s type turns high his consumption becomes
e¢ cient at any subsequent period, irrespective of the subsequent types. Our analysis clari￿es what
drives this di⁄erence and shows more generally how the dynamics of distortions can be understood
in terms of the dynamics of the impulse responses of future types to the initial ones.
Eso and Szentes (2007) consider a two-period model with many agents but with a single allocation
decision, to be made in the second period. They represent an agent￿ s second-period type as a
function of his ￿rst-period type and a random shock that is independent of the ￿rst-period type,
and use this representation to study the e⁄ects of the seller￿ s disclosure of information on surplus
extraction.10 Our analysis uses an independent-shock approach similar to that in Eso and Szentes
(2007) to identify primitive conditions in an in￿nite-horizon setting with many decisions and decision-
controlled processes that validate the dynamic envelope formula as a necessary condition for incentive
compatibility (Interestingly, the independent-shock approach can be dispensed with in ￿nite-horizon
models, in which backward induction coupled with integration by parts can be used to obtain an
alternative derivation of the envelope formula. This backward-induction approach, ￿rst used by
Baron and Besanko (1984), was generalized in an earlier version of this paper.)
8Related is also a recent paper by Krahmer and Strausz (2011) that extends the analysis in Courty and Li (2000)
to a setting where the information the agent receives in the second period is the result of a non-contractible action.
9Allowing for an in￿nite horizon is important: Some applications naturally have an in￿nite horizon; others are
facilitated by abstracting from terminal dates, for example because they permit a recursive representation. This,
however, introduces complications stemming for example from the need to spread the payments appropriately over
time and from the impossibility of using backward induction to establish incentive compatibility. Likewise, allowing
for multiple agents and decisions not only permits novel applications, it introduces novel e⁄ects stemming for example
from the inferences that the agents make over time about the other agents￿types and actions. Allowing for general
payo⁄s and type processes confers ￿ exibility to the model and also permits us to identify general principles.
10Board (2007) extends the analysis in Eso and Szentes (2007) to an environment where the timing of the allocation
decision is endogenous.
6A few recent papers propose transfer schemes for implementing e¢ cient (i.e., expected surplus-
maximizing) dynamic mechanisms that generalize static VCG and expected-externality mechanisms
(see, e.g., Bergemann and V￿lim￿ki (2010), Athey and Segal (2007), and the references therein).
These papers, however, do not provide a general analysis of incentive compatibility in dynamic
settings.11;12
A number of independent papers (Board (2008), Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009a,b,c 2010a,b,c),
Board and Skrzypacz (2010), Dizdar et al., (2011), Pai and Vohra (2008), Said (2011)) consider
e¢ cient or pro￿t-maximizing dynamic mechanisms in settings where each agent receives only one
piece of private information but where the agents or objects arrive stochastically over time. The
characterization of incentive compatibility in all these papers is static and interesting dynamics
emerge from the optimal stopping problem faced by the designer.13 Building on this literature and
on the results in the current paper, Garrett (2011) recently shows that novel interesting e⁄ects emerge
when private information about arrival dates is coupled with private information about time-varying
valuations.
The paper is also related to the literature on dynamic optimal taxation. While the early literature
typically assumes i.i.d. shocks (e.g. Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas
(1992)), the more recent literature considers the case of persistent private information (e.g., Fernandes
and Phelan (2000), Golosov et al. (2003), Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Golosov
and Tstvinski (2006), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Zhang (2009), Kapicka (2010)). Particularly
related are Farhi and Werning (2011) and Golosov et al. (2011), who use a ￿rst-order approach to
characterize the properties of optimal dynamic tax codes. Related are also the recent literature on
￿nancial contracting with persistent private information on income dynamics (e.g., Tchistyi (2006),
Biais et al. (2007), Williams (2011)) and the recent literature on dynamic managerial compensation
(Garrett and Pavan (2011a,b), Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Edmans et al., (2011)) that applies
the ￿rst-order approach to a setting where the manager￿ s productivity changes with time.
Dynamic mechanism design is also related to the literature on multidimensional screening, as
noted, e.g., in Rochet and Stole (2003). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which incentive compatibility
is easier to ensure in a dynamic setting than in a static multidimensional setting. This is because in a
dynamic setting an agent is asked to report each dimension of his private information before learning
the subsequent dimensions, and so has fewer deviations available than in the corresponding static
11An alternative characterization of dynamic incentive compatibility is developed by Rahman (2010) who extends
Rochet￿ s (1987) cyclical monotonicity to a dynamic environment. The applicability of this approach to the design of
optimal mechanisms is, however, yet to be explored.
12In a recent paper, Kakade et al. (2011) build on our ￿rst-order approach to characterize the properties of revenue-
maximizing allocation rules in environments satisfying a certain separability-in-the-￿rst-component condition. They
then show that these rules can be implemented through the virtual analog of the dynamic pivot payments of Bergemann
and V￿lim￿ki (2010).
13For a survey of these papers see Bergemann and Said (2011).
7setting in which he observes all the dimensions at once. Because of this, the set of implementable
allocation rules is larger in a dynamic setting than in the corresponding static multidimensional
setting. On the other hand, our necessary conditions for incentive compatibility are valid also for
multidimensional screening problems.
The literature on dynamic mechanism design is also related to the literature on dynamic con-
tracting with adverse selection and limited commitment (see, e.g., La⁄ont and Tirole (1988, 1990),
and more recently Skreta (2006) and the references therein). While this literature typically assumes
constant types and generates interesting dynamics through the lack of commitment, the literature on
dynamic mechanism design assumes full commitment (on the principal￿ s side) and generates interest-
ing dynamics either through variations in types (as in this paper), or through population dynamics
(as in the literature discussed above).14
Finally, we also touch here upon the issue of transparency in mechanisms. Calzolari and Pavan
(2006a,b) study its role in environments in which downstream actions (e.g. resale o⁄ers in sec-
ondary markets, or more generally contract o⁄ers in sequential common agency) are not contractible
upstream. Pancs (2007) also studies the role of transparency in environments where agents take
nonenforceable actions such as investment or information acquisition. As in these papers, we iden-
tify conditions under which the decisions that the mechanism makes in each period with each of the
agents can be disclosed to the other agents without inducing a loss of pro￿ts for the principal.
2 The Environment
Decisions. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;:::;1. There are N ￿ 1 agents, indexed by
i = 1;:::;N. In each period t, each agent i observes a signal ￿it 2 ￿it = (￿it;￿ ￿it) ￿ R for some
￿1 ￿ ￿it ￿ ￿ ￿it ￿ +1 and then sends a message to a mechanism which leads to an allocation
xit 2 Xit and a payment pit 2 R for each agent i.15 Each Xit is assumed to be a measurable space





This formulation allows for the possibility that the set of feasible allocations in a given period depends
on the allocations in the previous periods, or that the set of feasible allocations for agent i depends
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s=0 Xs.16
The sets ￿t, ￿t
i, and ￿t are de￿ned analogously. Let ￿1
i ￿
Q1




In each period t, each agent i observes his own allocation xit but not the other agents￿allocations
14A couple of recent papers that combine lack of commitment with change in types are Battaglini (2007) and Strulovici
(2011).
15Hereafter we will refer to each ￿it interchangeably as agent i￿ s period-t signal or period-t type.





it xit ￿ ￿ xg; while the provision of a public good whose period-t production is independent of the level of
production in any other period can be modelled by letting X =
Q1
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￿
.
8x￿i;t.17 The observability of xit should be thought of as a constraint: in each period, a mechanism can
reveal more information to agent i than xit, but it cannot conceal xit. Our necessary conditions for
incentive compatibility do not depend on what additional information is disclosed to the agent by the
mechanism. As for su¢ cient conditions, we provide conditions under which additional information
can be disclosed to the agents without violating incentive compatibility (e.g., we will construct
payments that can be disclosed in each period and identify conditions under which the other agents￿
reports and allocations can also be disclosed).
Stochastic Processes. The evolution of each agent i￿ s information is described by a collection













tion of the random variable ~ ￿it, given the history of past signals ￿t￿1
i 2 ￿t￿1
i and past allocations
xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1
i .20;21 The dependence on past decisions can capture, e.g., learning-by-doing or ex-
perimentation (see the bandit-auction application below). The time-t signals of di⁄erent agents are









. We slightly abuse notation by using Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) to denote the
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) corresponding to the measure Fit(￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ).
Note that we build in the assumption of ￿independent types￿in the sense of Athey and Segal
(2007): in addition to independence of agents￿signals within any period t, we require that the







these restrictions, payo⁄ equivalence in general fails by an argument analogous to that of Cremer
and McLean (1988). On the other hand, dependence on other agents￿past signals through the
implemented observable decisions xt￿1
i is allowed.
Preferences. Each agent i has von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries on ￿￿X￿R,
described by a Bernoulli utility function of the quasilinear form Ui (￿;x)+Pi, where Ui : ￿￿X ! R,
and where Pi is a function of the payments received by agent i. The leading case is the one where Pi
is the Net Present Value (NPV) of agent i￿ s payments, but in some applications it can be a non-linear
function thereof ￿see, e.g., Garrett and Pavan (2011b) and the discussion below.





17This formulation does not explicitly allow for decisions that are not observed by any agent at the time they are
made; however, such decisions can be accomodated by introducing a ￿ctitious agent observing them.
18For any measurable set B; ￿(B) denotes the set of probability measures over B.
19All functions are assumed to be measurable throughout the paper.
20Throughout, tildes will be used to denote random variables, whereas the same variable without tilde will denote a
realization. Also note that the sets ￿it denote the sets over which the supports of the kernels are de￿ned as opposed
to the supports of the kernels themselves.
21Hereafter, we follow the convention that any set with superscript ￿1 is simply the empty set.
22With ￿nite horizon, the payments can be made all at once after the mechanism is over. With in￿nite horizon,
however, the payments have to be spread over time. We will ensure that this can be done in Section 5 below.
9We impose the following technical conditions on the utility functions.23
Condition 1 (U-D) Utility Di⁄erentiable: For each i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0, x 2 X, and ￿ 2 ￿,
Ui (￿i;￿￿i;x) is di⁄erentiable in ￿t
i 2 ￿t
i.








We ￿x a discount factor ￿ 2 (0;1) and de￿ne the norm k￿ik ￿
P1
t=0 ￿t j￿itj, and let ￿i￿ =
f￿i 2 ￿1
i : k￿ik < 1g.24 With this norm, we then assume that the following condition holds:
Condition 2 (U-ELC) Utility Equi-Lipschitz Continuous: For each i = 1;:::;N, the function fam-
ily fUi (￿;￿￿i;x)g￿￿i2￿￿i;x2X is equi-Lipschitz continuous on ￿i￿. In other words, there exists a







￿ ￿ ￿ Ai
￿ ￿￿0
i ￿ ￿i
￿ ￿ for all ￿i;￿0
i 2 ￿i￿, ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i;
x 2 X.
For example, time-separable payo⁄s of the form Ui(￿;x) =
P1
t=0 ￿tui(￿it;￿￿i;t;xt) satisfy U-
D and U-ELC if ui is di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz in the ￿rst argument (e.g., linear payo⁄s
ui(￿it;￿￿i;t;xt) = ￿itxit are ￿ne provided that xit is bounded).
Allocation rules. A feasible allocation rule is a mapping ￿ : ￿ ! X such that for every t, the
allocation ￿t (￿) implemented in period t depends only on the history ￿t (and so will be written as
￿t(￿t)). We denote the set of feasible allocation rules by X. The restriction to deterministic allocation
rules is without loss of generality since randomized rules can be accommodated by introducing a
￿ctitious agent whose reports are used to generate the randomizations. (Below we provide conditions
for a pro￿t-maximizing allocation rule to be deterministic.)
Given the kernels F, an allocation rule ￿ 2 X uniquely de￿nes a stochastic process over ￿, which
we denote by ￿[￿].25 Also, for any agent i and initial signal ￿i0, we let ￿i [￿]j￿i0 denote the analogous
process where agent i￿ s initial signal is drawn from a degenerate distribution that puts probability
one on ￿i0. We assume that these processes have an Expected Present Value (primitive conditions
on the kernels that ensure this assumption for every ￿ are given in Lemma 2 below).
23To facilitate the reading, throughout the entire exposition, we will denote by U- conditions referring to the utility
functions and by F- conditions referring to the processes. All relevant conditions are summarized in the list at the end
of the document.
24Observe that we could always rescale ￿it to normalize ￿ = 1, making k￿k coincide with the standard l1 norm on
sequences. However, we allow ￿ < 1 to deal without rescaling with the standard economic applications with time
discounting. Note as well that for a ￿nite horizon, the norm k￿k is equivalent to the Euclidean norm for any ￿ > 0, and
so the choice of ￿ is irrelevant. For in￿nite horizon, increasing ￿ weakens the conditions imposed below on the utility
function while strengthening the conditions imposed on the kernels.
25This probability measure exists and is unique by the Tulcea extension theorem (see, e.g., Pollard (2002), Chapter
4, Theorem 49).
10Condition 3 (F-BE0) Process Bounded in Expectation at time 0: For each i = 1;:::;N, ￿i0 2 ￿i0;
and ￿ 2 X; E￿i[￿]j￿i0[jj~ ￿ijj] < 1.
Condition F-BE0 implies, in particular, that for any feasible allocation rule ￿, for ￿i [￿]j￿i0￿ almost
all ￿i in ￿i, jj￿ijj < 1. That is, with ￿i [￿]j￿i0￿ probability one, ~ ￿i 2 ￿i￿.
The mechanism design problem. In addition to the N agents, there is a ￿principal￿(labeled




for some function U0 : ￿￿X ! R. As standard in the literature, we assume that the principal makes
a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er of a mechanism to the agents in period zero, after each agent i has observed
his initial type ￿i0. At that point, each agent can either accept the mechanism or reject it. By
rejecting the mechanism, an agent obtains his reservation payo⁄, which for simplicity we normalize
to zero for all agents and types.26 The principal￿ s mechanism design problem thus consists in choosing
a dynamic choice rule h￿;￿i, which consists of a feasible allocation rule ￿ 2 X and a payment rule
￿ : ￿ ! RN, so as to maximize his ex-ante expected payo⁄E￿[￿][U0(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿))￿
PN
i=1 ￿i(~ ￿)] subject to
the agents￿incentive-compatibility and period-0 participation constraints (formally de￿ned below).
2.1 Application: Bandit Auctions
Throughout the paper, we use the following application to illustrate the type of problems our results
can be applied to. A pro￿t-maximizing seller (the principal) must design a sequence of auctions to
sell o⁄, in each period, an indivisible, non-storable, good to a set of N ￿ 1 bidders who re￿ne their
valuations upon consumption, i.e., upon winning the auction. This setup captures novel applications
such as repeated sponsored search auctions where the advertisers privately learn about the expected
pro￿tability of clicks on their ads, or repeated procurement with learning-by-doing. It provides a
natural example of an environment where the kernels depend on past allocations.
For any i = 0;:::;N and t ￿ 0, Xit = f0;1g, with xit = 1 in case the good is allocated to
player i in period t and xit = 0 otherwise (the seller￿ s decision to withhold the good in period







i=0 xit = 1 8t ￿ 0
o
.
The seller￿ s payo⁄ function is given by U0(￿;x) = ￿
P1
t=0 ￿t PN
i=1 xitci, where ci 2 R is the cost
of allocating the object to agent i (notice that we have normalized c0 = 0). The bidders￿payo⁄
26If an agent can accept the mechanism but then quit at a later stage, this would give rise to participation constraints
in subsequent periods. However, in a quasilinear setting with unlimited transfers, the principal could ask the agent to
post a su¢ ciently large bond upon acceptance, to be repaid later, so as to make it unpro￿table to quit at any time
during the mechanism. For this reason, we ignore participation constraints in all periods other than the initial period.
Note, however, that in non-quasilinear settings where agents have a consumption-smoothing motive, bonding is costly,
and so participation constraints may bind in many periods ￿see, e.g., Hendel and Lizzeri (2003) and Garrett and Pavan
(2011b).
11functions take the form Ui(￿;x) =
P1
t=0 ￿t￿itxit for i = 1;:::;N: These functions trivially satisfy
Conditions U-D, and U-ELC.
The type process for any bidder i = 1;:::;N is determined as follows. The ￿rst period valuation
￿i0 is drawn from ￿i0, with ￿i0 > ￿1, according to an absolutely continuous, strictly increasing
c.d.f. Fi0. For any t > 0, ￿t￿1
i 2 ￿t￿1
i , and xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1
i , ￿it is then drawn from the kernel
Fit(￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ). Each kernel Fit(￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) depends on the history of past types ￿t￿1
i only through
the last observation ￿i;t￿1 and depends on the history of past decisions xt￿1
i only through xi;t￿1
and
Pt￿1
￿=0 xi￿: In particular, if xi;t￿1 = 1 (meaning that the agent won the auction in the preceding
period), then Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) is strictly increasing and absolutely continuous in ￿it with mean
bounded in absolute value uniformly over all histories: that is, there exists a scalar Ki < 1 such
that EFit(￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1









0 if ￿it < ￿i;t￿1;
1 if ￿it ￿ ￿i;t￿1:
This formulation embodies the following key assumptions: (1) Bidders￿valuations change only upon
winning the auction (i.e., if xi;t￿1 = 0, then ￿ti = ￿i;t￿1 almost surely); (2) The valuation processes
are time-homogenous (i.e., if bidder i wins the object in period t ￿ 1, then the distribution of his
period-t valuation depends only on his valuation in period t ￿ 1 and the total number of times he
won in the past). Finally, the assumption that the mean of each kernel is bounded in absolute value
uniformly over histories guarantees that condition F-BE0 holds.27
This kind of structure arises, for example, in a Bayesian learning model with Gaussian signals.
That is, suppose that each bidder i has a constant but unknown true valuation vi for the object
and starts with a prior belief vi ￿ N(￿i0;￿i) where the precision ￿i is common knowledge. Each
time upon winning the auction, bidder i receives a (conditionally i.i.d.) private signal si ￿ N(vi;￿i)
and updates his expectation of vi using standard projection formulae. Take ￿it to be bidder i￿ s
posterior expectation in period t. Then, there exist a sequence Ri = (Ri(￿jk))k2N of absolutely
continuous, strictly increasing, and continuously di⁄erentiable c.d.f.￿ s with mean bounded in absolute
value uniformly in k such that, given ￿i;t￿1; xi;t￿1 = 1; and
Pt￿1
s=0 xis = k;
Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = Ri(￿it ￿ ￿i;t￿1jk):
The function Ri(￿jk) is the c.d.f. for the change in the posterior expectation due to the k-th signal,
which is independent of the current value of ￿it. (One can, in fact, easily verify that Ri(￿jk) is a
Normal distribution with mean zero and variance decreasing in k.) Alternative speci￿cations for the
kernels can be used to model learning-by-doing, habit formation, etc.
27See Lemma 2 below.
12Throughout the paper, we will provide results that will help us solve for the sequence of auctions
that maximize the seller￿ s ex-ante expected pro￿ts in the environment described above.
3 First-Order Necessary Conditions for Incentive Compatibility
A key contribution of the paper is in establishing a ￿rst-order necessary condition for the imple-
mentability of a dynamic choice rule h￿;￿i. To make the result as strong as possible, we focus on
the weakest solution concept, Bayes-Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, when providing su¢ cient
conditions for implementability in Section 5 below, we assume a stronger solution concept, Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium.
A general mechanism asks the agents to send messages in each period and then implements
allocations and payments based on the agents￿reports and discloses some information to the agents
in each period. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium for such mechanism is a pro￿le of contingent reporting
strategies such that each agent i￿ s strategy maximizes the expected payo⁄for every starting type ￿i0,
assuming that the other agents follow their equilibrium strategies. This solution concept satis￿es the
Revelation Principle: without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to implementing a given
choice rule in a ￿direct￿mechanism, in which each agent i￿ s message space in each period t is his
type space ￿it, no additional information is disclosed to him (in addition to his observed allocation
xit), and in equilibrium the agents report their types truthfully.












i ) 2 ￿it represents the report in period t when the true type history is ￿t
i, the
reported type history is ^ ￿
t￿1
i , and the allocation history is xt￿1
i . In the direct mechanism implement-
ing the choice rule h￿;￿i, when the other agents report truthfully, this deviation results in the choice











i (￿t￿1);(￿ ￿ ￿i)
t￿1
i (￿t￿1)), and of the payment rule (￿ ￿ ￿i)(￿) = ￿(￿ ￿i (￿);￿￿i).
Truthtelling being a Bayes-Nash equilibrium means that any such deviation cannot improve upon
truthtelling:
De￿nition 1 (BNIC) The choice rule h￿;￿i is Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible (BNIC) if for
each agent i, each initial type ￿i0, agent i￿ s equilibrium payo⁄
V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) ￿ E￿i[￿]j￿i0
h
Ui(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) + ￿i(~ ￿)
i
(1)
cannot be raised by deviating to any reporting strategy ￿i, i.e., for any such strategy we have
V
h￿￿￿i;￿￿￿ii
i (￿i0) ￿ V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0).28
28In particular, this inequality requires that V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) be well-de￿ned and ￿nite, while V
h￿￿￿i;￿￿￿ii
i (￿i0) be either
￿nite or ￿1. The same applies to the de￿nition of on-path IC below.
13We derive a necessary condition for BNIC by applying an envelope theorem to the agent￿ s problem
of choosing the optimal reporting plan for the dynamic problem described above. Since the space
of reporting plans is quite rich, we use an argument similar to that used by Milgrom and Segal
(2002). This approach requires that, for any ￿xed reporting strategy, the objective function be
well-behaved (di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous) in the parameter. As anticipated in the
Introduction, this is unfortunately not automatically guaranteed in a dynamic setting even if the
utility function and the type process are seemingly well-behaved. The reason is that the agent￿ s
expected payo⁄ depends on the parameter ￿i0 not just through its impact on the utility function
Ui, but also through its e⁄ect on the stochastic process ￿i[￿]j￿i0 that determines his future types.
Because future allocations may depend on future types in arbitrary ways when arbitrary mechanisms
and strategies are considered, there is no guarantee that the aforementioned properties hold.
To circumvent the di¢ culty, we transform each agent￿ s problem by representing his type process
in terms of a sequence of independent shocks, and then use this auxiliary representation to identify
primitive properties on the stochastic processes and on the utility functions that guarantee that each
agent￿ s expected payo⁄ is su¢ ciently well-behaved in the parameter ￿i0.
De￿nition 2 (S-representation) A triple hEi;Gi;zii where Ei ￿ hEiti
1
t=0 is a collection of measur-
able spaces, Gi ￿ hGiti
1





i ￿ Eit ! ￿it
￿1
t=0 is a collection of functions, is a state representation of agent














is a random variable






when ~ "it is a random variable distributed according to Git.
The collection hE;G;zi ￿ hEi;Gi;zii
N
i=1 is a state representation of the kernels F ￿ (F1;:::;FN) if
for every i = 1;:::;N, hEi;Gi;zii is a state representation of agent i￿ s kernels Fi.
This de￿nition means that the process ￿i [￿]j￿i0 can be generated as follows: Let ~ " be a random
variable on ￿1
t=1￿N
i=1Eit such that each component ~ "it is distributed according to Git and the com-













tinue be a su¢ cient statistics for the agent￿ s private information in period t with respect to what is






is not one-to-one). This approach
was ￿rst adopted in a mechanism-design context by Eso and Szentes (2007) in the special case of a
two-period model.
As discussed below, it is a standard result on stochastic processes that any collection of kernels
F admits a state representation. However, because the canonical representation used to establish
this property is not necessarily the most convenient one in applications, below we derive our results
for arbitrary state representations satisfying the following condition:
14Condition 4 (F-BIR0) Process Bounded Impulse Responses at t = 0. The kernels F admit a state
representation with the following property: For each i = 1;:::;N, de￿ne the functions
￿


























￿=0 : For each ￿i0 2 ￿i0, t ￿ 0, xi 2 Xi, "t
i 2
Et
i; the derivative @Zit(￿i0;xt￿1
i ;"t
i)=@￿i0 exists and is bounded in absolute value by Cit ("i), where
E[jjCi (~ "i)jj] < 1 for all ￿i0.
We are now ready to establish that the following condition is necessary for BNIC:
De￿nition 3 (ICFOC0) The choice rule h￿;￿i satis￿es ICFOC0 (time-0 ￿rst-order condition for
incentive compatibility) if, for each i = 1;:::;N, agent i￿ s equilibrium expected payo⁄ V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) is


































We then have the following result.
Theorem 1 (Necessity of ICFOC0) Under Conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE0 and F-BIR0, any
BNIC choice rule satis￿es ICFOC0:
By Theorem 1, (3) is a dynamic generalization of the Mirrlees￿ formula familiar from static
mechanism design (Mirrlees, 1971; see also Myerson, 1981). By inspection, it implies a dynamic
payo⁄-equivalence result: in any BNIC mechanism, each agent￿ s period-0 interim expected utility is
pinned down by the allocation rule ￿ up to a constant.
Example 1 (Bandit Auctions) In the bandit-auction application where payo⁄s are time-separable





















30Note that the impulse responses are conditional expectations. As such, they are uniquely de￿ned only with ￿[￿]-
probability one.
15Example 2 (Separable Payo⁄s) More generally, for any payo⁄function Ui(￿;x) =
P1
t=0 ￿tuit(￿it;xit)
that is time-separable, with each uit di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous in the ￿rst argu-




















By noting that Ii0 ￿ 1 (as Zi0(￿i0;"i1) = ￿i0 for all ￿i0 by de￿nition), we see that the ￿rst term in the
sum is the one familiar from static models. It measures the direct e⁄ect of an in￿nitesimal change
in ￿i0 on the agent￿ s utility. The other terms are speci￿c to the dynamic environment. Heuristically,
the period-t term, t > 0, measures the indirect e⁄ect of ￿i0 on the agent￿ s period-t utility due to the
fact that a change in ￿i0 causes a change in ￿it, which is captured by the function Iit. \\
Special cases of the envelope formula (6) have been identi￿ed by Baron and Besanko (1984),
Besanko (1985), Courty and Li (2000), and Eso and Szentes (2007), among others. We develop
the connections below when discussing the interpretation of the I-functions de￿ned by (4) and the
canonical state representation. However, it should be noted that the contribution of Theorem 1 is not
just in the generalization of the formula, but in having identi￿ed conditions on the primitives (i.e.,
utility functions and type processes) which guarantee that ICFOC0 is indeed a necessary condition
for any BNIC choice rule.
Heuristically, the proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by focusing on strategies in which agent i is
allowed to misreport his initial type ￿i0 but is then forced to report all the subsequent shocks "it,
t > 0, truthfully. Note that, in the original ￿-representation, this is equivalent to assigning to each
type ￿i0 a type-speci￿c set of possible strategies for the entire game. Each set contains the truthful
strategy (the one that entails truthful reporting in each period), along with a continuum of other
strategies indexed by the initial report ^ ￿i0 2 ￿i0. More speci￿cally, each type ￿i0 can report any type
^ ￿i0 2 ￿i0 in period zero, but is then forced to conform to the following reporting strategy in each
subsequent period t > 0 : given the true period-t type ￿it = Zit(￿i0;xt￿1
i ;"t
i), the agent is constrained
to report ^ ￿it = Zit(^ ￿i0;xt￿1
i ;"t
i): For any initial report ^ ￿i0 2 ￿i0, and for all possible choice rules
h￿;￿i, we can then establish that the agent￿ s interim expected payo⁄ is well-behaved in the true
type ￿i0. In particular, it is equi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in ￿i0, in which case the
envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) can be used to calculate the derivative of the agent￿ s
value function.31 The formal proof follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the ￿ctitious environment in which each type process is
generated via independent shocks ~ " and where, in each period t ￿ 1; each agent i = 1;:::;N observes
31As anticipated in the introduction, alternative speci￿cations of the set of possible strategies need not permit one
to arrive to the same conclusions. In particular, for certain choice rules h￿;￿i, the agent￿ s interim expected payo⁄ may
fail to be equi-Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in ￿i0 when, after lieing in period 0; in each subsequent period
t > 0, the agent reports his future type ￿it truthfully.






(recall that the function need not be invertible
in "it). Consider the direct revelation mechanism in the ￿ctitious environment in which each agent







￿0; ^ ￿t￿1 ￿
￿0;"t￿1￿
;"t￿￿
in each period t (de￿ned recursively on t) with payment
rule ^ ￿(￿0;") = ￿(Z (￿0; ^ ￿(￿0;");")) (where Zt ￿ (Zit)
N
i=1 ; Zt = (Zs)t
s=0, and Z ￿ (Z)1
t=0).
Suppose that agent i misreports his initial type to be ^ ￿i0 2 ￿i0 and then reports the shocks
truthfully (and the others report truthfully). The agent￿ s resulting payo⁄ under this strategy is
^ Ui(^ ￿i0;￿i0;￿￿i;0;") ￿ Ui(Z(￿i0;￿￿i;0; ^ ￿(^ ￿i0;￿￿i;0;");"); ^ ￿(^ ￿i0;￿￿i;0;")) (7)
+^ ￿i(^ ￿i0;￿￿i;0;"):
That the choice rule h￿;￿i is BNIC implies that truthful reporting by each agent in each period
must constitute a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium of this new mechanism. In turn, this implies that each
agent i cannot improve his expected utility by misreporting his period-0 type and then reporting the
subsequent shocks truthfully. That is, for any ￿i0 2 ￿i0,
V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) = sup
^ ￿i02￿i0
W(^ ￿i0;￿i0) = W(￿i0;￿i0), where W(^ ￿i0;￿i0) ￿ E
h
^ Ui(^ ￿i0;￿i0;~ ￿￿i;0;~ ")
i
:
Now we establish the following crucial lemma (proof in the Appendix).
Lemma 1 Under the assumptions in the Theorem, for any i = 1;:::;N; ^ ￿i0 2 ￿i0; Wi(^ ￿i0;￿) is















^ ￿i0;~ ￿￿i;0; ^ ￿
￿












^ ￿i0; ^ ￿t￿1
i
￿












The equi-Lipschitz continuity of Wi(^ ￿i0;￿) established in the Lemma implies that the value func-
tion sup
^ ￿i02￿i0
W(^ ￿i0;￿i0), which by BNIC must coincide with the equilibrium payo⁄ V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0); is
Lipschitz continuous.32 Furthermore, by Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Segal (2002), at any di⁄eren-
tiability point of V
h￿;￿i









Using Lemma 1, the Law of Iterated Expectations, and the de￿nition of Iit in (4) yields the result.
























￿ ￿ M j￿
0
i0 ￿ ￿i0j,
where M > 0 is the constant of equi-Lipschitz continuity of W: This argument is similar to the ￿rst part of Milgrom
and Segal￿ s (2002) Theorem 2.
173.1 Interpretation: Impulse Responses
Throughout this section, for simplicity, we momentarily drop the index referring to agent i. The
functions It emerging from Theorem 1 are calculated as derivatives of the period-t signals with respect
to the period-0 signal holding the intermediate independent shocks ￿xed. They can be interpreted
as nonlinear impulse responses of the stochastic process. To see this, apply Theorem 1 to a situation
with ￿xed decisions and no payments (i.e., Xt = f^ xtg for each t = 0;:::;1, and ￿(￿) = 0 for all
￿ 2 ￿), in which case the optimization is irrelevant, and we simply have V h￿;￿i(￿0) ￿ E￿j￿0[U(~ ￿; ^ x)].
Then (3) takes the form













Note that the impulse response functions It are determined entirely by the stochastic process and
satisfy formula (8) given any utility function U satisfying Conditions U-D and U-ELC.33




de￿ned in De￿nition 2 is




, we can use the chain rule to calculate the impulse responses











for all t ￿ 1: (9)
The derivative @zm=@￿l can be interpreted as the ￿direct impulse response￿of the signal in period
m to the signal in period l < m. The ￿total￿impulse response @Zt=@￿0 is then obtained by adding
up the products of the direct impulse responses over all possible causation chains from period 0 to
period t:
The simplest illustration is given by processes in which impulse responses are (time-dependent)
constants:
Example 3 (AR(k)) Let ￿t evolve according to an autoregressive (AR) process that is independent
of allocations:





￿j~ ￿t￿j + ~ "t,
where ~ ￿t = 0 for any t < 0; ￿j 2 R for any j 2 N and ~ "t is a random variable distributed according
to some c.d.f. Gt with support Et ￿ R with all the ~ "t drawn independently of each other and of ~ ￿0.
Thus, hE;G;zi is a state representation for the kernels. Then the impulse responses (9) take the
33We conjecture that this property uniquely de￿nes the impulse response functions with ￿j￿0-probability 1 (and not
just their expectation). However, even if it does not, no matter the particular representation one favors, as long as this








￿lk￿lk￿1 for t ￿ 1, while I0 = 1: (10)
E.g., in the special case of an AR(1) process, ￿j = 0 for all j > 1, and hence It = (￿1)
t. Note




￿t jItj < 1, which in the AR(1) case is satis￿ed if and only if ￿ j￿1j < 1. To verify
Condition F-BE0, write
~ ￿t = Zt(￿0;~ "t) = It￿0 +
Pt








￿=1 jIt￿￿jE[j~ "￿j] = kIk(j￿0j + E[k~ "k]):
Hence, Condition F-BE0 is ensured by assuming, in addition to kIk < 1, that E[k~ "k] < 1, which
simply requires that the mean of the shocks grows slower than the discount rate. (E.g., it is trivially
satis￿ed if "t are i.i.d. with a ￿nite mean.) \\
For example, when payo⁄s are time-separable, in the sense of Example 2, and the type process














A special case of this formula appeared in Besanko (1985), and two-period versions were also noted
by Baron and Besanko (1984), Courty and Li (2000), and Eso and Szentes (2007).
Inspired by Example 3, we can ensure Conditions F-BE0 and F-BIR0 for more general processes
by bounding them with an AR process (proof is straightforward and hence omitted).
Lemma 2 Suppose that (￿t)
1
t=1 2 R1
+ are the coe¢ cients of an AR process whose impulse responses
It, given by (10), satisfy kIk < 1. Then
(a) If hE;G;zi is a state representation of F where for each m ￿ 1, each (￿m￿1;xm￿1;"m) 2













for all l < m, then Condition F-BIR0 holds.
(b) If, for all t ￿ 1, all
￿
￿t￿1;xt￿1￿







￿j j￿t￿jj + Et, with
kEk < 1, then Condition F-BE0 holds .
193.2 Canonical State Representation
It follows from standard results on stochastic processes that any collection of kernels F admits a state
representation where the z-functions are given by the inverses of the kernels (see, e.g., the Second
proof of the Kolmogorov extension theorem in Billingsley, 1995, p. 490). We can use this canonical
representation to derive a simple formula for the impulse responses:
Proposition 1 (Canonical Representation) (a) The following is a State Representation (hence-
forth the canonical representation) of F: For each i = 1;:::;N; each t ￿ 0, Eit = (0;1), Git is the
uniform distribution on (0;1) and, for any (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) 2 ￿t￿1
i ￿ Xt￿1
i ; "it 2 (0;1);
zit(￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ;"it) = F￿1
it ("itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) ￿ inff￿it : Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) ￿ "itg: (12)
(b) Furthermore, if for all i = 1;:::;N; all t ￿ 1, all xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1
i , the c.d.f. Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) is
continuously di⁄erentiable in (￿it;￿t￿1
i ), then for all i = 1;:::;N, t ￿ 1; ￿ 2 X; ￿i0 2 ￿i0, ￿i [￿]j￿i0-
almost all (￿t
i;xt￿1
























i ) ￿ @Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i )=@￿it is the density function of Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ).
Proof. (a) By the probability integral transform theorem (see, e.g., Angus (1984)), for any
i = 1;:::;N; any t ￿ 0; any (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) 2 ￿t￿1
i ￿ Xt￿1




distributed according to the c.d.f. Fit(￿j￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) thus proving that hE;G;zi is a state representation
of F.




i ) = "im: Re-
stricting attention to (￿m￿1
i ;xm￿1




i ) > 0, which




















Now use (9) and (4) to calculate the impulse responses.
Example 4 (Bandit Auctions) Consider the version of our bandit-auction application where,
given (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ); xi;t￿1 = 1 implies that Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = Ri(￿it ￿￿i;t￿1j
Pt￿1
￿=0 xi￿). By (12), we
then have that, for all i = 1;:::;N, t > 0, "it 2 (0;1), all (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1





i ;"it) = F￿1
it ("itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1





20Thus using (9) and (4) we have that Iit(￿t
i;xt￿1






Example 5 (Markov Process) Suppose that agent i￿ s types evolve according to a Markov process
whose kernels are independent of past decisions (and hence denoted by Fit(￿itj￿i;t￿1)), with Fit(￿itj￿i;t￿1)
continuously di⁄erentiable in (￿it;￿i;t￿1). Using the canonical state representation, the impulse re-











To understand the formula, note that when the kernels are Markov, the only causation chain from
the initial type to the period-t type is the one that passes through all the adjacent intermediate
periods, and so the impulse response is the product of the direct adjacent impulse responses. \\
Two-period versions of the formula in (13) were arrived at by Baron and Besanko (1984), Courty
and Li (2000), and Eso and Szentes (2007). In particular, Baron and Besanko (1984) suggested




as a measure of ￿informativeness￿of ￿0 about ￿1. We ￿nd the term impulse response preferable.
First, for linear processes, it matches the usage in the time-series literature. Second, it appears more
descriptive: for example, in the case of a time-homogeneous AR(1) process with a unit root, i.e.,
￿t = ￿t￿1 + "t, the impulse response is identical to one in every period (It ￿ 1 for all t) given any
distributions G for "t, t > 0, whereas, at an intuitive level, ￿0 may be more or less informative about
￿t depending on G.
4 The Relaxed Program and Distortions
In a static setting, the envelope formula for the agents￿equilibrium payo⁄s permits one to calculate
the agents￿information rents, providing a useful tool for designing optimal mechanisms. We now
show how this approach extends to a dynamic setting. We start by using ICFOC0 to express the
agents￿information rents entirely in terms of the allocation rule ￿. We then use this representation to
set up a ￿relaxed program￿incorporating only a subset of all the relevant constraints whose solution
provides a candidate for the optimal allocation rule. In the next section, we provide su¢ cient
conditions for a solution to this relaxed program to be implementable and thus constitute an optimal
allocation rule. Before doing so, at the end of this section, we discuss how the allocation rule that
solves the relaxed program di⁄ers from the e¢ cient allocation rule and how the (dynamics of the)
discrepancy between the two can be understood in terms of the properties of the impulse responses.
21Now consider again the principal￿ s problem, as stated in Section 2: Choose a BNIC choice




i (￿i0) ￿ 0 for all i = 1;:::;N, all ￿i0 2 ￿i0: (14)
This problem is in general analytically intractable. The approach typically followed in the lit-
erature consists in considering a simpler problem in which the constraints on the choice rule are
relaxed: Instead of requiring that the choice rule be BNIC, this approach only requires it satisfy
ICFOC0. Furthermore, instead of imposing all the participation constraints (14), it only imposes the
constraints for each agent i￿ s lowest type ￿i0, which we assume to be ￿nite:
V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) ￿ 0 for all i = 1;:::;N: (15)
(Note that requiring incentive compatibility only in the sense of BNIC, which does not impose
sequential rationality, can also be viewed as a relaxation.)
Formally, the Relaxed Program is stated as follows:
max
￿2X;￿:￿!RN E￿[￿][U0(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) ￿
N X
i=1
￿i(~ ￿)] s.t. ICFOC0 and (15). (16)
Assuming that each initial distribution Fi0 is absolutely continuous with density fi0(￿i0) > 0 for all
￿i0 2 ￿i0 and integrating by parts, we can then use ICFOC0 to express the ex-ante expectation of
the transfers to the agents in terms of the allocation rule ￿ and of the expected equilibrium payo⁄s
V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) of the lowest period-0 types. Denoting by ￿i0(￿i0) ￿ fi0(￿i1)=(1 ￿ Fi0(￿i1)) the hazard
rate of the distribution Fi0 of each agent i = 1;:::;N; we then have the following result (proof is
straight forward and hence omitted):
Proposition 2 (Principal￿ s Payo⁄) Assume that Conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE0, F-BIR0 hold,
and ￿i0 > ￿1 for all i = 1;:::;N. Then the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ under any BNIC choice rule
h￿;￿i is given by
E￿[￿][U0(~ ￿;￿(~ ￿)) ￿
N X
i=1
























Finally, note that for any allocation rule ￿; it is possible to construct a transfer rule to satisfy






dq dq ￿ Ui (￿;￿(￿)), where the integrand is given by the envelope formula (3)). It follows
34As usual, it is without loss of generality to restrict the principal to o⁄er mechanisms that are always accepted in
equilibrium, as long as the non-participation option can be made available within the mechanism.
22that a feasible allocation rule ￿ is part of a solution to the Relaxed Program if and only if it maximizes




















among all feasible allocation rules.
Example 6 (Bandit Auctions) Consider our bandit-auction application. Using (5), we have that






















The relaxed problem in the bandit-auction application thus takes the form of a standard multi-armed
bandit problem with a safe arm corresponding to not selling to any bidder (equivalently, allocating
the good to the seller, i.e., x0t = 1) and yielding a sure payo⁄ equal to zero, and N risky arms





i (￿)). The solution to this relaxed program takes the form of a virtual
index policy. That is, de￿ne the virtual Gittins index of bidder i = 1;:::;N in period t ￿ 0 given
history (￿t
i;xt￿1
























where T is a stopping time, and ￿ ￿i is the allocation rule that assigns the object to bidder i in all
periods. (Note that the index depends on xt￿1
i only through
Pt￿1
￿=0 xi￿.) The index of the seller
is identically equal to zero in all periods and for convenience we write it as ￿0t(￿t
0;xt￿1
0 ) ￿ 0.
The following "virtual index" allocation rule then solves the relaxed program in our bandit-auction
application:35 for all i = 1;:::;N, t ￿ 0, ￿t 2 ￿t,






We will come back to the implementability of the above index policy in Section 5 below, after we
present our su¢ ciency results. Before doing so, we ￿rst discuss the distortions (relative to e¢ ciency)
due to pro￿t maximization.
35The optimality of virtual index policies in the relaxed program follows by standard arguments (see, e.g., Whittle,
1982 and Bergemann and V￿lim￿ki, 2008).
234.1 Distortions
We now compare the allocation rules solving the relaxed program to their e¢ cient counterparts, i.e.,








Of course, this analysis is useful only insofar as the solution to the relaxed program can be shown to
satisfy all the constraints of the full program. We provide su¢ cient conditions for this in Section 5.
In particular, these conditions cover the allocation rules that arise in the examples discussed below.
Similarly to the static setting, the principal introduces distortions to reduce the agents￿expected
information rents. In contrast to the static setting, however, the expected information rent of agent














and so it is determined not just by the properties of his utility function and the hazard rate of the ￿rst-
period distribution, but also by the properties of the impulse responses. We illustrate the dependence
of distortions on impulse responses by ￿rst considering our bandit-auction application and then by
considering a few more examples that help understand the ￿ndings of the earlier literature for the
speci￿c processes being considered, and the extent to which those ￿ndings generalize.
Example 7 (Bandit Auctions) Consider our bandit-auction application. The allocation rule that
maximizes the expected social surplus E￿[￿]
hP1
t=0 ￿t PN




is the index policy
￿￿





where the indexes are given by
￿￿
it(￿it;xt￿1










for all i = 1;:::;N, t ￿ 0; ￿it 2 ￿it and, xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1
i . From (18) and (21) we have that
￿it(￿t
i;xt￿1













i . That is, the pro￿t-maximizing virtual index for





which is responsible for i￿ s information rent. Now consider the special version of the bandit problem
where Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = Ri(￿it ￿ ￿i;t￿1j
Pt￿1
￿=0 xi￿) when xi;t￿1 = 1; as in the Gaussian updating
model. In this case Iit(~ ￿
t
i;xt￿1




i ; so that the
24handicap [￿i0(￿i0)]
￿1 for each bidder i is entirely determined by his initial type ￿i0 and is constant
over time. As the seller￿ s index is zero in both problems, the fact that the handicaps are constant
over time implies permanent distortions under the pro￿t-maximizing policy. Moreover, when initial
hazard rates are nondecreasing, bidders with higher initial types have lower handicaps and in e⁄ect
receive preferential treatment in all periods over those with lower initial types.
Also note that, with N ￿ 2, distortions are in general in both directions. The presence of
the handicaps leads the seller to keep the object too often, which implies downward distortions at
some histories. However, since the e¢ cient indices are independent of past types, there can exist
histories (￿t;xt￿1) 2 ￿t ￿ Xt￿1 such that for some bidders i and j, ￿it(￿t
i;xt￿1





i ) > 0, and ￿￿
it(￿it;xt￿1
i ) < ￿￿
jt(￿jt;xt￿1
j ). At any such history the current allocation of
bidder i is distorted upwards. For example, in the special case of pure Bayesian learning about the
true valuation of each bidder i, this implies that the pro￿t-maximizing policy settles on an ine¢ cient
bidder more often than the e¢ cient policy. Furthermore, despite the handicaps being constant,
distortions may increase over time. To see this, consider the case where all bidders are ex-ante
identical and consider a state at which ￿i0(￿i0) > 0 all i = 1;:::;N: Symmetry then implies that
the pro￿t-maximizing rule allocates the good e¢ ciently in the ￿rst period. This, however, need not
be the case in subsequent periods, because of the distortions in the relative ranking of the virtual
indexes introduced by the handicaps. Furthermore, because the indexes also depend on the number
of past wins, such ine¢ ciencies can cumulate over time, making distortions increase with the number
of preceding periods. \\
For simplicity, the next few examples consider environments with a single agent. To ease the
notation, we thus momentarily drop the subscript i = 1 from each Xit and ￿it.
Example 8 (Markov Separable) Consider the following buyer-seller relationship. The buyer￿ s
preferences have the same time-separable structure as in Example 2, i.e., U1 (￿;x) =
P1
t=0 ￿tut(￿t;xt),
with ￿ ow payo⁄s given by ut(￿t;xt) = (a + ￿t)xt; with Xt =
￿
0;a + ￿ ￿t
￿
, a 2 R++: The principal￿ s
payo⁄ (here in the role of the seller) is given by U0 (￿;x) = ￿
P1
t=0 ￿tx2
t=2. The buyer￿ s private
information evolves according to the Markov process given in example (5) with ￿t = (0;1); all t ￿ 0.




= a + ￿t for all t ￿ 0. Using the derivation of


















for all t ￿ 0: (22)
Suppose that the kernels satisfy First-Order Stochastic Dominance, i.e., Ft(￿tj￿t￿1) is nonincreasing
in ￿t￿1 for all t ￿ 1, all ￿t 2 ￿t. In that case, the impulse responses are all nonnegative, and therefore
consumption is always weakly below the e¢ cient level. Also, under the standard assumption that the
25period-0 hazard rate ￿0(￿0) is nondecreasing, the distortions in all periods vanish at the highest initial
type ￿0 = ￿ ￿0, paralleling the classical ￿nding of the static screening model. However, the dependence
of distortions on subsequent types hinges on the more delicate properties of the impulse response
functions. For example, note that F￿(￿ ￿￿j￿￿￿1) = 1 and F￿(￿￿j￿￿￿1) = 0 for any ￿￿￿1 2 ￿￿￿1, and




, all ￿ ￿ 1: Therefore, if for any ￿ ￿ 1; any
￿￿￿1 2 ￿￿￿1; f￿(￿￿j￿￿￿1);f￿(￿ ￿￿j￿￿￿1) > 0, we see that the impulse response in period t turns to zero
at both the highest and the lowest type. Due to the Markov nature of the process, this severs the
causal e⁄ect of the initial type and eliminates distortions from that period onward. On the other
hand, for intermediate types, distortions could be strict, in which case consumption in period t is
nonmonotone in the intermediate types ￿2;:::;￿t￿1. \\
Example 9 (Nonlinear AR Process) Suppose payo⁄s are as in the previous example and con-
sider the following family of nonlinear AR processes: ￿t = ￿(￿t￿1) + "t, where ￿(￿) is an increasing
di⁄erentiable function with ￿(0) = 0 and ￿(1) < 1, whereas the shocks "t are independent over time,
with support [0;1 ￿ ￿(1)]. The impulse responses then take the form It(￿t) =
t￿1 Q
￿=0
￿0 (￿￿) (this can
be derived from the given state representation, or from the canonical representation assuming that















Note, in particular, that ￿ exhibits downward distortions since ￿0 > 0. In this setting, increasing
type ￿￿ in a period ￿ ￿ 1 reduces distortions in subsequent periods if the function ￿(￿) is concave,
but increases these distortions if the function is convex. When ￿(￿) is neither concave nor convex,
distortions are nonmonotone in previous types.
Besanko (1985) considers the special case of this setting in which ￿(￿) is linear in ￿. In this case,
the allocation in period t depends only on ￿0 and ￿t and not on the intermediate types ￿2;:::;￿t￿1.
As the example shows, for more general functions ￿, the allocation in period t may be increasing,
decreasing, or nonmonotone in the intermediate types.
Lastly note that distortions need not be shrinking over time: E.g., whenever ￿0 (￿t) > 1, distortions
in period t + 1 exceed those in period t. \\
Example 10 (Discrete Types) Next consider a setting where payo⁄s are as in the preceding
two examples, but where the type spaces ￿t are discrete, to which the ￿rst-order approach is
not directly applicable, but can be adapted by focusing on local downward incentive constraints
instead of ICFOC and using discrete versions of the impulse responses. For simplicity, we begin
with the setting of Battaglini (2005), who considers a Markov process over the binary type space
￿t = fL;Hg for each t. For this setting, we can use the following state representation hE;G;zi:









= L otherwise. This induces a Markov process on the types with
transition probabilities Prf~ ￿t = Hj￿t￿1g = q￿t￿1, and the assumption qH > qL ensures positive
serial correlation. In this setting, the discrete one-period-ahead impulse response can be de￿ned
as I (￿t￿1;￿t) = 1
H￿LE[z (H;~ "t) ￿ z (L;~ "t)jz (￿t￿1;~ "t) = ￿t], i.e., the expected e⁄ect of the previous
type being H rather than L on the current type, given the observed previous and current types
(￿t￿1;￿t). It is then easy to see that I (￿t￿1;￿t) = 0 whenever the type switches, i.e., ￿t 6= ￿t￿1. For
example, when type switches from ￿t￿1 = L to ￿t = H, this means that "t > 1 ￿ qL, and therefore
"t > 1 ￿ qH, hence the new type would also have been H had the previous type been H. Similarly,
when the type switches from H to L, the new type would also have been L had the previous type
been L. Due to the Markov nature of the process, the impulse response of the period-t type to the






I (￿￿;￿￿+1), and therefore as soon as the type switches,
the causal e⁄ect of the initial type is severed, ensuring e¢ ciency from that point onward.
Observe also that the solution to the relaxed program is e¢ cient when the initial type is H,
since only type H￿ s incentive constraint is considered in the relaxed program. These arguments
yield Battaglini￿ s ￿Generalized No Distortion at the Top Principle￿ (GNDTP): any switch to H
yields e¢ ciency from that period onward. Battaglini￿ s other conclusion is the ￿Vanishing Distortions
at the Bottom Principle￿ (VDBP): the distortions for histories (L;:::;L) shrink with time. This
conclusion can be understood by noting that the impulse response at (￿t￿1;￿t) = (L;L) is less than
1: indeed, for some of the shocks that leave type L unchanged, had the previous type been H instead
of L, the current type would have been H.
This logic also demonstrates that GNDTP extends to any discrete type process satisfying FOSD:
indeed, when type ￿t￿1 switches to the highest possible type ￿t = ￿ ￿t, this implies that any previous
type ￿0
t￿1 > ￿t￿1 would have also switched to ￿ ￿t. Since the relaxed program considers only downward
adjacent incentive constraints, this means a period-(t ￿ 1) type ￿0
t￿1 who pretended to be ￿t￿1 is no
longer distinguishable from ￿t￿1, in which case distortions should be eliminated forever. This logic
is similar to the ￿nding of Example 8 for the case of positive densities at endpoints. However, in the
discrete version of Example 8, the distortions need not be eliminated by switching from ￿t￿1 to the
lowest possible type ￿t. Indeed, since it is the downward local IC constraints that bind in the relaxed
program, and since types above ￿t￿1 may not have switched to ￿t by experiencing the same shocks
thus remaining distinguishable, this creates a reason to distort after reporting ￿t. We conclude that
VDBP also generalizes to multiple discrete types.
Nonetheless, as the number of discrete types increases, the results become qualitatively closer to
the continuous-type case than to Battaglini￿ s two-type case, since the binding downward adjacent
IC constraints start approximating the ICFOC constraints. For example, while GNDTP and VDPB
still hold, their relevance decreases as the number of types grows, for these properties apply only
27to histories that occur with a small probability. Furthermore, as the distance between the two
lowest types vanishes, distortions ￿at the bottom￿become arbitrarily small immediately from t = 1:
For intermediate types, distortions can in general be nonmonotone in type, as in the previous two
examples. \\
The one property that is robust in all of the three examples above is that of downward distortions.
In Proposition S1 in the Supplementary Material, we use monotone comparative statics results
to establish su¢ cient conditions for this property to hold in a general dynamic setting. As we
explain there, downward distortions obtain in many applications featuring a single-agent but are
more di¢ cult to ensure with multiple agents, because of possible capacity constraints that prevent
the choice set X from being a lattice (e.g., recall Example 7 above, where distortions are sometimes
upward). However, upward distortions can naturally arise even in applications with one agent. To
see this, consider the relaxed problem (22) in Example 8. By inspection, the direction of distortions










If the kernels do not satisfy ￿rst-order stochastic dominance, this impulse response may be negative
leading to upward distortion in the allocation. This was ￿rst demonstrated by Courty and Li (2000),
who provide a concrete two-period example where the distribution of the agent￿ s second-period type
is ordered by his ￿rst-period signal in the sense of a mean-preserving spread.
5 PBE-Implementability
We now provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an allocation rule ￿ to be implementable in a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism h￿;￿i. In such a mechanism, in each
period t, each agent i, after observing his type ￿it 2 ￿it, submits a report ^ ￿it 2 ￿it. Given the reports
^ ￿
t
; the mechanism then implements the allocation ￿it(^ ￿
t
) for each agent i, which is observed by the
agent (and no other information is disclosed to the agent). The mechanism also makes payments
with NPV ￿i(^ ￿) to each agent i. Below, we will show how these payments can be spread over time in
a way that they can be disclosed to the agent without a⁄ecting his incentives to report truthfully.36
36Our focus is on mechanisms with minimal information disclosure as this maximizes the set of implementable choice
rules. However, all of our results apply verbatim to more general information disclosure policies by simply reinterpreting
xi to contain all information disclosed by the mechanism to agent i. (For example, one can let Xit = ^ Xit ￿￿
t
￿i, where
^ Xit is the set of physical allocations, and ￿
t
￿i is a ￿vocabulary.￿Then by an appropriate choice of ￿ the mechanism
can reveal to agent i any information about the other agents￿messages in periods s = 0;:::;t. Even random disclosure
can be allowed by conditioning on reports of a ￿ctitious agent.)





i ) of the true type history ￿t
i, the reported type history ^ ￿
t￿1
i , and the allocation
history xt￿1
i . We restrict attention to direct mechanisms for which on-path truthful reporting is opti-
mal, i.e., specify truthtelling whenever the agent has been truthful in the past: ￿it(￿t
i;￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = ￿it
for all i = 1;:::;N; all ￿t￿1
i 2 ￿t￿1
i , all xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1
i .





i ) about the unobserved past moves of Nature (￿t￿1
￿i ) and of the other
agents (^ ￿
t￿1
￿i ). (The agent￿ s beliefs about the contemporaneous types of agents j 6= i then follow






￿i )):) We restrict these beliefs to satisfy two natural
conditions:








i are independent of his true type history ￿t
i.








i assign probability one to the other agents having reported truthfully, i.e., to




Condition B(i) is in the same spirit as condition B(i) in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.333). It is
motivated by the fact that, given agent i￿ s reports ^ ￿
t￿1
i and observed allocations xt￿1
i , the distribution
of his true types ￿t
i is independent of the other agents￿types or reports (since in each period ￿ ￿ t, ￿i￿






, independently of the other agents￿types). This condition
will be important for deriving the envelope formula below (if agent i￿ s beliefs over ￿t￿1
￿i could vary
with ￿t
i, his information rent could be extracted as in Cremer and McLean (1988)). Condition B(ii)
in turn says that agent i always believes that his opponents have been following their equilibrium
strategies. This condition is also natural ￿ e.g., agents could be constrained to send reports in the
support of their kernels, in which case no report history would be inconsistent with truthtelling.
Furthermore, with continuous distributions, any particular type pro￿le has zero probability, which
explains why condition B(ii) cannot be derived from Bayes￿rule and has to be imposed.
Under the two conditions, we can describe agent i￿ s beliefs as a collection of contingent probability







, t ￿ 0, where ￿it(^ ￿
t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) represents agent i￿ s beliefs
over the other agents￿past types ￿t￿1
￿i given that he reported ^ ￿
t￿1







De￿nition 4 (On-path truthful PBE) We say that an on-path truthful strategy pro￿le ￿ and a
belief system ￿ form an on-path truthful PBE of the direct mechanism h￿;￿i if (a) beliefs ￿ satisfy
conditions B(i) and B(ii) and are consistent with Bayes￿rule on all positive-probability events, and
(b) each agent￿ s strategy maximizes his expected payo⁄ at each information set given the beliefs ￿,
29assuming that the other agents follow their equilibrium strategies (i.e., in this case, continue to report
truthfully).
Given an allocation rule ￿, we denote the set of beliefs satisfying part (a) of the de￿nition by
￿(￿), dropping the argument if ￿ is clear from the context.
Part (a) of the de￿nition simply means that the belief system is a system of regular conditional
probability distributions. The existence of a system of regular conditional probability distributions
is well known (see, e.g., Dudley (2002)). Given an allocation rule ￿ and a belief system ￿, we
let ￿i[￿;￿]j￿t￿1;￿it denote the stochastic process over ￿ from the eyes of agent i in period t when
the agent has reported truthfully in the past, the complete report history is ￿t￿1; and agent i￿ s
current type is ￿it. Formally, ￿i[￿;￿]j￿t￿1;￿it is the unique probability measure over ￿ obtained
by ￿rst drawing ~ ￿
t￿1












￿i )), and then applying the kernels F and the allocation rule ￿







From now on, we take the belief system ￿ as given and focus on part (b) of the PBE de￿nition.
In particular, this part requires that truthtelling remains optimal for each agent at all on-path
information sets, i.e., at those information sets reached via truthful reporting:
De￿nition 5 (On-path BIC) Fix i 2 f1;:::;Ng and s ￿ 0. The choice rule h￿;￿i with belief
system ￿ is on-path Bayes Incentive Compatible for agent i in period s, if for each (￿s￿1;￿is) 2
￿s￿1 ￿ ￿is, agent i￿ s equilibrium time-s expected payo⁄
V
h￿;￿i;￿
is (￿s￿1;￿is) ￿ E￿i[￿;￿]j￿s￿1;￿is
h
Ui(￿(~ ￿);~ ￿) + ￿i(~ ￿)
i
(23)
cannot be raised by the deviation to any reporting strategy ￿i such that ￿it(￿t
i;￿t￿1
i ;￿t￿1
i (￿t￿1)) ￿ ￿it
for all t < s. That is, for any such strategy, we have V
h￿￿￿i;￿￿￿ii;￿
is (￿s￿1;￿is) ￿ V
h￿;￿i;￿
is (￿s￿1;￿is).
The choice rule h￿;￿i with belief system ￿ is on-path Bayes Incentive Compatible (on-path BIC) if
the above property holds for all agents i = 1;:::;N; all periods s ￿ 0.
The concept of on-path BIC extends the concept of BNIC de￿ned in Section 3 from period 0 to
all periods. Thus, Theorem 1 can be extended to an arbitrary period to state necessary ￿rst-order
conditions for on-path BIC. For this purpose, we extend Conditions F-BE0 and F-BIR0 to apply to
all periods as follows:37
Condition 5 (F-BE) Process Bounded Expectations: For any i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0, (￿t￿1;￿it) 2





37These conditions could be in turn ensured by verifying the simple su¢ cient conditions on the kernels F given in
Lemma 2 above.
30Condition 6 (F-BIR) Process Bounded Impulse Responses: The kernels F admit a state repre-
































￿=0 : For each i = 1;:::;N; s ￿ 0; t ￿ s; ￿s
i 2 ￿s
i,
xi 2 Xi, "i 2 Ei the derivative @Zi;(s);t(￿s
i;xt￿1
i ;"t
i)=@￿is exists and is bounded in absolute value by
Ci;(s);t￿s ("i), where E[jjCi;(s) (~ "i)jj] ￿ Bi < 1.
For any i = 1;:::;N, s ￿ 0; and t ￿ s; then let
Ii;(s);t(￿t
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denote the impulse response of agent i￿ s period-t type to the period-s type. Then the de￿nition of
ICFOC and its necessity extend as follows (proof follows from the same arguments as for s = 0).
De￿nition 6 (ICFOCs) Fix i 2 f1;:::;Ng and s ￿ 0. The choice rule h￿;￿i with belief sys-
tem ￿ satis￿es ICFOCi;s if, for any ￿s￿1 2 ￿s￿1; agent i￿ s equilibrium time-s expected payo⁄
V
h￿;￿i;￿

















For any s ￿ 0; the choice rule h￿;￿i with belief system ￿ satis￿es ICFOCs if it satis￿es ICFOCi;s
for all agents i = 1;:::;N:
Proposition 3 (Necessity of ICFOCs) Assume Conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE, F-BIR hold. If
a choice rule h￿;￿i with belief system ￿ is on-path BIC, then it satis￿es ICFOCs in each period
s ￿ 0.
5.1 Payment Construction
We now show how, for any given allocation rule ￿ and accompanying beliefs ￿, one can construct
transfers that satisfy ICFOCs in all periods s ￿ 0. In addition, with in￿nite horizon, the transfers
cannot be postponed until the mechanism is over, and we want to be able to spread the transfers
over time, in the following sense:
31De￿nition 7 (Spreadable payments) Given the choice rule h￿;￿i with accompanying beliefs ￿,
the payment rule ￿ : ￿ ! RN is spread over time with ￿ow payments
￿
 t : ￿t ! RN￿1
t=0 if the











Part (ii) of the de￿nition means that the ￿ ow payments to agent i have a ￿nite Expected Present
Value (EPV), in the sense of double Lebesgue-Stieltjes integration, at any of his information sets.
This will allow us to appeal to Fubini￿ s theorem to interchange expectation and in￿nite summation
in calculating expected present values, and also ensures that the series in (i) converges absolutely
with probability one.
To be able to construct transfers that can be spread over time, we make the following assumption
on the utility function:
Condition 7 (U-SPR) Utility Spreadable: For all i = 1;:::;N, there exists a sequence of functions
￿
uit : ￿t ￿ Xt ! R
￿1
t=0 and constants Li and (Mit)1
t=0 with Li;jjMijj < 1 such that for all (￿;x) 2










￿ ￿ Lij￿itj + Mit:
For example, the condition is satis￿ed if the functions uit are uniformly bounded, or if they take
the linear form uit(￿t;xt) = ￿itxit with Xit bounded but ￿it possibly unbounded.
The following result establishes the existence of transfers satisfying ICFOCs for all s ￿ 0 (proof
in the Appendix):
Proposition 4 Assume Conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE, F-BIR and U-SPR hold. Take any alloca-




































for some arbitrarily ￿xed type sequence ￿0






























Then (i) the transfers ￿ in (28) are spread over time with ￿ow payments  , and (ii) the choice rule
h￿;￿i with beliefs ￿ satis￿es ICFOCs in all periods s ￿ 0.
Remark 1 Note that the ￿ ow payments  it
￿
￿t￿








This means that they do not reveal to agent i any information beyond that contained in the allocations
xi. Hence they can be disclosed to the agent without a⁄ecting his beliefs (and hence his incentives).\\
32Example 11 (Bandit Auction) Consider the version of our bandit auction application where,
given (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ), xi;t￿1 = 1 implies that Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = Ri(￿it ￿ ￿i;t￿1j
Pt￿1
￿=0 xi￿); in which
case conditions F-BE and F-BIR are clearly satis￿ed38 and Ii;(s);t(￿t
i;xt￿1
i ) = 1 all i = 1;:::;N; all
t;s; all (￿t
i;xt￿1
i ) 2 ￿t
i ￿ Xt￿1


































for some arbitrarily ￿xed type sequence ￿0
i 2 ￿i￿: The ￿rst term in (29) is the bidder￿ s expected
continuation payo⁄, whereas the second term is the continuation rent that the seller leaves to the
bidder to induce him to report truthfully. These payments, which are obtained from (28), guarantee
that ICFOCs is satis￿ed in all periods. \\
Having established existence of a payment rule ￿ that ensures ICFOCs in all periods s ￿ 0, it is
interesting to examine to what extent ICFOC pins down these payments for a given allocation rule ￿.




for each starting type ￿i0; in any mechanism implementing a given allocation rule ￿ as a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. This extends the celebrated Revenue Equivalence result for static mechanism design to
the dynamic setting.
Under the following additional condition, we can actually establish a stronger version of this
result.










￿i )) does not depend on ￿t￿1
￿i (and so can be




This condition means that the observation of ￿it never gives agent i any information about the
other agents￿types. Clearly, any allocation rule satis￿es this property when the agent￿ s process
evolves autonomously from the allocations, or (trivially) in a single-agent setting. We then have the
following result (proof in the Appendix):39
Proposition 5 (Payment Equivalence) Assume that conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE, and F-BIR




that, respectively under beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿) and
￿ ￿ 2 ￿(￿), are on-path BIC. Suppose that the allocation rule ￿ leaks no information to agent i and











￿ j￿i;t￿1j + B for some constant B independent of t by the uniform
bound on the means of Ri(￿jk), k 2 N ￿recall the result in Lemma 2.
39The notation ￿i [￿]j￿i in the proposition denotes the unique measure over the other agents￿types ￿￿i that is
obtained from the kernels F and the allocation ￿ by ￿xing agent i￿ s reports at ^ ￿i = ￿i:















The result in Proposition 5 is established using ICFOC in all periods as opposed to just in period
0. Its implications are particularly sharp in a single-agent setting. In this case, the payments ￿
that implement a given allocation rule ￿ are pinned down by ICFOC with probability one, and not
just in expectation. This conclusion proves important for solving problems in which the principal
cares not just about the expectation of the payments (as in our Relaxed Program above), but also
about how the payments vary with the state ￿. For example, this includes models where  t (￿) is
interpreted as the ￿utility payment￿to the agent in period t whose monetary cost to the principal
is some convex function ￿ ( t (￿)), as in models where the agent is risk-averse with respect to the
payments and has preferences for consumption smoothing. In such models, knowing the NPV ￿(￿) of
￿utility payments￿required to implement a given allocation rule helps computing the cost-minimizing
distribution of the payments over time and hence the principal￿ s expected cost of sustaining a given
allocation rule. This is in turn instrumental to the selection of the pro￿t-maximizing rule (see Farhi
and Werning (2011) for an application to dynamic taxation and Garrett and Pavan (2011b) for an
application to managerial compensation).40
5.2 Markov Environments
From now on, we focus on sustaining strong truthtelling strategies, where an agent reports truthfully
at any private history. This focus is clearly restrictive, since in general an agent who lied in the past
may ￿nd it optimal to continue lying. Characterizing such sequentially optimal contingent strategies
is quite di¢ cult, which explains why we focus on settings in which strong truthtelling can indeed be
sustained. In particular, these settings include Markov environments, de￿ned as follows:
40The result in Proposition 5 can be derived from BNIC rather than on-path BIC, as long as the kernels have a
connected support. The complication arising in this case is that BNIC does not ensure that the equilibrium continuation
payo⁄ after period zero satisfy the envelope formula (26). Indeed, the continuation payo⁄ need not even be continuous
in ￿it, since the choice rule may be modi￿ed arbitrarily at zero-probability events while preserving BNIC. Nonetheless,
the argument behind Proposition 3 still applies to the value function (i.e., the supremum expected payo⁄ achieved
by possible reporting plans starting at a given history). Namely, it shows that the value function must be Lipschitz
continuous and its derivative must satisfy ICFOC at each on-path history at which truthful reporting is optimal.
Furthermore, the principle of dynamic programming ensures that, in a BNIC choice rule, truthtelling is optimal for
probability-1 histories, i.e., almost everywhere on the support of the process. Hence, when the kernels￿supports are
connected, the value function satis￿es condition (42). Since the value function coincides with the equilibrium expected
payo⁄ at probability-1 histories, all the preceding arguments extend to BNIC when the supports are connected.
34De￿nition 9 (Markov Environment) The environment is Markov if, for each i = 1;:::;N, the
following conditions hold:
(a) Process Markov Bounded (F-MB): for any t ￿ 2, any xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1






does not depend on ￿t￿2





), and there exists constant ￿i and
(Eit)1












￿i j￿itj + Ei;t+1.
(b) Utility Markov Spreadable (U-MSPR): the utility is spreadable with each function uit
depending on ￿t





This de￿nition ensures that, after observing ￿t
i, the kernels governing agent i￿ s future types as
well as his vNM preferences over future lotteries depend on his type history ￿t
i only through ￿it (but
can depend on past decisions xt￿1, as well as, in the case of interdependent values, on other agents￿
past types, ￿t￿1
￿i ). This guarantees that the agent￿ s reporting incentives in period t depend only on
his previous reports, and not on whether these reports have been truthful. The other parts of the
de￿nition help guaranteeing that (i) payments can be spread over time, and (ii) that an appropriate
version of the one-stage-deviation principle applies. Finally, observe that condition F-MB implies
condition F-BE.
We can now state our second main result, which uses the properties of the Markov environment
to turn our necessary conditions into necessary and su¢ cient conditions for PBE implementability.
For any ^ ￿it 2 ￿it; let ￿￿^ ￿it denote the allocation rule obtained from ￿ by replacing ￿it with ^ ￿it; i.e.,




and let the functions D be as de￿ned in (27).
Theorem 2 Suppose that, in addition to Conditions U-D, U-ELC, and F-BIR, the environment is
Markov. An allocation rule ￿ 2 X with sustaining beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿) can be implemented as an on-path











dr ￿ 0: (30)
When this is the case, the allocation rule ￿ 2 X can be implemented in a strong truthtelling PBE
with payments given by (28).
Proof. We start by establishing the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Consider a function ￿ : (￿;￿)2 ! R. Suppose that (a) for all ^ ￿ 2 (￿;￿); the function
￿(￿;^ ￿) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿, and (b) the function ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;￿) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿.








dq ￿ 0 (31)
where ￿ ￿0(￿) ￿ d￿ ￿(￿)=d￿:
35Proof of the Lemma: Let g(￿;^ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿;^ ￿). For any ￿xed ^ ￿ 2 (￿;￿), g(￿;^ ￿) is Lipschitz















For any ￿ 2 (￿;￿), the function ￿(￿;￿) is thus maximized at ^ ￿ = ￿ if and only if (31) holds. ￿





i ); let ￿i(￿it;^ ￿it) denote agent i￿ s expected payo⁄in period t (given the
belief system ￿) when, after having observed the signals ￿t￿1
i and having reported ^ ￿
t￿1
i in the past





￿i ), the agent observes the period-t signal ￿it,
reports ^ ￿it, and then reverts to strong truthtelling from period-(t + 1) onwards (assuming that all
other agents follow a truthful strategy in each period).
Necessity. Suppose that the allocation rule ￿ 2 X with sustaining beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿) can be
implemented as an on-path truthful PBE of a direct mechanism. Recall that this means that there
exists a payment rule ￿ such that the choice rule h￿;￿i together with the beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿) is on-
path BIC. The result in Proposition 3 then implies that the choice rule h￿;￿i along with the beliefs
￿ 2 ￿(￿) satis￿es condition ICFOCs, for all s ￿ 0: In turn, this means that, at any truthful history
(and because the environment is Markov, at non-truthful histories as well), the function ￿ ￿i(￿it) ￿
￿i(￿it;￿it) satis￿es condition (b) in Lemma 3, with ￿ ￿0
i(￿it) = D
￿;￿
it (￿t￿1;￿it) for a.e. ￿it 2 ￿it, as
implied by ICFOCi;t:
Next, for any agent i = 1;:::;N, period t ￿ 0 and message ^ ￿it 2 ￿it, consider the choice rule D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
that is obtained from h￿;￿i by ignoring agent i￿ s period-t report ￿it and replacing
it with ^ ￿it. Using the properties of the Markov environment we then have the following key result
(proof in the Appendix):
Lemma 4 Suppose that the environment is Markov and that the choice rule h￿;￿i with accompa-
nying beliefs ￿ satis￿es ICFOCt+1: Then for any i = 1;:::;N, t ￿ 0; and ^ ￿it 2 ￿it; the choice rule D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
with accompanying beliefs ￿ satis￿es ICFOCi;t.
That the choice rule
D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
with accompanying beliefs ￿ satis￿es ICFOCi;t in turn
implies that the function ￿i(￿;^ ￿it) is Lipschitz continuous in ￿it with derivative given for a.e. ￿it
by D
￿￿^ ￿it;￿
it (￿t￿1;￿it): This means that ￿i(￿;^ ￿it) satis￿es property (a) in Lemma 3. We conclude
that the integral monotonicity condition (30) is a necessary condition for on-path truthful PBE
implementability, for any i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0; ￿t 2 ￿t, ^ ￿it 2 ￿it:
Su¢ ciency. Given the allocation rule ￿ 2 X with sustaining beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿), let ￿ be the
payment rule whose payments are given by (28). Because the conditions in the theorem imply the
conditions in Proposition 4, we know that the choice rule h￿;￿i along with the beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿),
36satisfy ICFOCs in all periods s ￿ 0. The results in Lemmas 3 and 4 above then imply that, for all
agents, a one-step deviation from strong truthtelling is not pro￿table at any history. The su¢ ciency
part of the result in the theorem then follows from the above results along with the following version
of the one-stage deviation principle (proof in the Appendix):41
Lemma 5 Assume that the conditions in Theorem 2 hold. Given the allocation rule ￿ with accom-
panying belief system ￿, let the payments ￿ be given by (28). Then if for any agent i = 1;:::;N
one-stage deviations from strong truthtelling are not pro￿table at any information set, arbitrary de-
viations from strong truthtelling are not pro￿table at any information set.
It is useful to contrast the result in Theorem 2 to its static counterpart (see, e.g., Carbajal and
Ely (2010), and the references therein). In the static model, the necessity of the integral monotonicity
condition comes directly from the fact that, ￿xing the agent￿ s message, the agent￿ s expected payo⁄
can simply be assumed Lipschitz continuous and di⁄erentiable in the true type. This implies Lipschitz
continuity of the value function so that the necessity of the integral monotonicity condition follows
trivially by the simple arguments in Lemma 3.
In contrast, in the dynamic model, ￿xing the agent￿ s period-t message, the Lipschitz continuity of
the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ in the current type ￿it (as well as the formula for the derivative) cannot
be assumed and instead must be derived from the agent￿ s optimizing behavior. The necessity of
the integral monotonicity condition is then established by showing that, in a Markov setting, the
fact that the choice rule h￿;￿i must satisfy the ICFOC conditions at all truthful histories implies
that the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ under any one-step deviation from truthtelling must also satisfy the
analog of these conditions with respect to the modi￿ed choice rule
D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
induced by the
lie. This step is non trivial and relies on the Markovness of the environment.
The other key di⁄erence pertains the su¢ ciency part of the result: in a static environment, one
can always construct payments that guarantee that the equilibrium payo⁄s are Lipschitz continuous
and satisfy the envelope formula, in which case incentive compatibility follows directly from the fact
that the allocation rule satis￿es the integral monotonicity condition. In contrast, in the dynamic
model, the possibility to construct payments that guarantee that deviations from truthtelling are
never optimal requires, in addition to the integral monotonicity condition, that the environment be
Markov (in which case past lies are irrelevant for current and future incentives and the validity of
the ICFOC conditions extends from truthful histories to all histories), along with an appropriate
version of the one-stage-deviation principle, which guarantees that in￿nitely-lasting deviations are
not pro￿table either.
41The usual version of the Principle, found, e.g., in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p.110), is not applicable in our
setting since the payo⁄s are not continuous at in￿nity when ￿ ow payments are not bounded ￿and the ￿ ow payments
(28) need not be bounded when ￿ is unbounded.
37In Subsection 5.2.1 below, we will discuss more stringent conditions that help establishing that
an allocation rule satis￿es the integral monotonicity conditions. Before doing so, we ￿rst show in
Corollary 1 below how the various results above can be combined together to establish the optimality
of a choice rule. Using the result in the previous theorem, we can ensure that, when the allocation
rule solving the relaxed program satis￿es the integral monotonicity conditions (31) in all periods, it
then also solves the full program. All that is left for this to be true is to ensure that all participation
constraints are satis￿ed. This can be done by assuming that the following condition also holds.
Condition 8 (F-FOSD) Process First-Order Stochastic Dominance: For all i = 1;:::;N, t ￿ 1,








is nonincreasing in ￿t￿1
i .
Corollary 1 (Optimal Mechanisms) Assume that the environment is Markov and satis￿es Con-
ditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BIR, and F-FOSD. In addition, assume that Ui (￿;x) is nondecreasing in ￿i
for each i = 1;:::;N. Let ￿ be an allocation rule that maximizes the expected dynamic virtual surplus
(17) and suppose that, with beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿), it satis￿es the integral monotonicity conditions (30) in
all periods. Then,
(a) there exists a payment rule ￿ that can be spread over time (with ￿ow payments that can be
disclosed to the agents) such that (i) strong truthtelling arises in a PBE of the direct mechanism
for h￿;￿i, (ii) the period-0 participation constraints of the lowest types bind, and (iii) all types￿
participation constraints are satis￿ed;
(b) The above choice rule h￿;￿i maximizes the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ among all BNIC-IR
choice rules;
(c) In any BNIC-IR choice rule that is optimal for the principal, the allocation rule must maximize
the expected dynamic virtual surplus (17).
(d) The principal￿ s expected payo⁄ cannot be increased using randomized mechanisms.
Proof. For part (a), consider the payments ^ ￿i (￿) = ￿i (￿) ￿ V
h￿;￿i
i (￿i0) for each i = 1;:::;N,
where ￿ is the payment rule given by (28). Since ^ ￿ only di⁄ers from ￿ by a constant, property (i)
follows from Theorem 2. Property (ii) holds by construction. For (iii), recall that the equilibrium





i0 (q)dq: Under F-FOSD and Ui (￿;x) nondecreasing in
￿i, D
￿;￿
i0 (q) ￿ 0 all q; which implies that V h￿;^ ￿i
i0 (￿i0) ￿ 0 all ￿i0:
Next, consider parts (b) and (c). These results are implied by Proposition 2. Finally, for part (d)
note that a randomized mechanism is equivalent to a mechanism that conditions on the random types
of some ￿ctitious agent. Since the expected virtual surplus in this expanded setting is independent
of the signals of the ￿ctitious agent and still takes the form (17), it is still maximized by the non-
randomized allocation rule ￿. Thus, applying part (a) of the Theorem to the expanded setting
implies that the deterministic choice rule h￿;￿i still maximizes the principal￿ s expected payo⁄. (A
similar point was made in a static mechanism design setting by Strausz (2006)).
385.2.1 Veri￿cation of the Integral-Monotonicity Condition
As in the static case, verifying that a given allocation rule satis￿es the integral monotonicity condi-
tions need not be simple. The trick that is typically used in the literature on static mechanisms is
to ￿nd conditions that guarantee that the integrand is everywhere positive for ^ ￿it ￿ ￿it and negative
for ^ ￿it ￿ ￿it. When the payo⁄ is supermodular and both the type and the decision are unidimen-
sional, this is guaranteed by the monotonicity of the allocation rule in the reported type. In a
dynamic setting, both the decisions and the information (the sequence of the agents￿signals) are
multi-dimensional. Furthermore, the derivatives in the integrand in (30) involve not only the payo⁄
functions but also the kernels. Notwithstanding these complications, the integral monotonicity con-
ditions can be veri￿ed by checking that the allocation rule satis￿es one of the more stringent (but
simpler) monotonicity conditions in Corollary 2 below (proof is immediate and hence omitted).









does not depend on xt￿1
i .
Corollary 2 (Monotonicities) The integral monotonicity conditions (30) of Theorem 2 are en-
sured by any of the following conditions (listed in decreasing order of generality):










￿it ￿ ^ ￿it
￿
￿ 0 (32)
for all ^ ￿it 2 ￿it; a.e. ￿it 2 ￿it (single crossing);
￿ For any i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0; (￿t￿1;￿it) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿it, D
￿￿^ ￿it;￿
it (￿t￿1;￿it) is nondecreasing in ^ ￿it
(average monotonicity);











is nondecreasing in ^ ￿it (ex-post monotonicity);
￿ In addition to conditions F-AUT, F-FOSD, for any i = 1;:::;N; Ui (￿;x) has increasing di⁄er-
ences in (￿i;xi) and is independent of x￿i; and ￿i (￿) is nondecreasing in ￿i, for all ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i
(strong monotonicity).
To see the relationship between the conditions, observe that the most stringent of the four, strong
monotonicity, essentially amounts to the requirement that each individual term in the sum in (33) be
nondecreasing in ^ ￿it (note that, under F-FOSD, Ii;(t);￿ ￿ 0). Ex-post monotonicity weakens this by
39requiring only that the sum be nondecreasing, which permits one to dispense with F-FOSD as well as
with the assumption that Ui has increasing di⁄erences. By recalling the de￿nition of the D-functions
in (27), it is also easy to see that average monotonicity in turn weakens ex-post monotonicity by
averaging over states, which also permits one to dispense with F-AUT. Finally, single-crossing further
relaxes average monotonicity by requiring that the expectation of the sum in (33) changes sign only
once at ^ ￿it = ￿it; as opposed to being monotone in ^ ￿it:
To the best of our knowledge, all results about optimal dynamic mechanisms in the literature￿
with the exception of the mean-preserving-spread case of Courty and Li (2000)￿ establish su¢ ciency
by verifying strong monotonicity.42 In Proposition 7, we provide primitive conditions that guarantee
that the allocation rule ￿ that solves the relaxed program (i.e., maximizes the expected dynamic
virtual surplus (17)) is strongly monotone. However, there are interesting problems where the solution
to the relaxed program fails to be strongly monotone, or where the kernels naturally depend on past
decisions or fail ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. In this case, su¢ ciency is established by verifying
average monotonicity, as shown below.
Proposition 6 (Bandit Auctions ￿Optimal Mechanism) Consider the version of our bandit
auction application where, given (￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ), xi;t￿1 = 1 implies that Fit(￿itj￿t￿1
i ;xt￿1
i ) = Ri(￿it ￿
￿i;t￿1j
Pt￿1
￿=0 xi￿); all i = 1;:::;N; all (￿;x) 2 ￿ ￿ X: Assume the hazard rates ￿i0(￿i0) of the initial
type distributions are nondecreasing in ￿i0, i = 1;:::;N. Let h￿;￿i be the choice rule where ￿ is the
virtual index policy de￿ned in (19) and where the payment rule is de￿ned by (29). The choice rule
h￿;￿i solves the principal￿ s full problem and can be implemented as a strong truthtelling PBE.
Proof of Proposition 6. The result follows from the conclusions in Corollary 1. In fact, the
environment is clearly Markov and satis￿es Conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BIR, and F-FOSD. Further-
more, each Ui (￿;x) is clearly nondecreasing in ￿i for each i = 1;:::;N, so that all the conditions
in the corollary apply. That the virtual index policy ￿ de￿ned in (19) maximizes the expected dy-
namic virtual surplus (17) has been proved above. It thus su¢ ces to show that this rule satis￿es the
integral monotonicity condition (30) in all periods. We establish this by showing that the virtual
index policy ￿ with accompanying beliefs ￿ 2 ￿(￿) (which are essentially pinned down by ￿ itself)
satis￿es average monotonicity, as de￿ned in Corollary 2. In particular, note that, in the contest of
this application, average monotonicity requires that, for any bidder i = 1;:::;N; any period s ￿ 0,





￿t(￿ ￿ ^ ￿is)it(~ ￿)
#
42The MPS case of Courty and Li (2000) is covered by our notion of ex-post monotonicity. In particular, this provides
an alternative proof of their Lemma 3.4, and allows dispensing with the di⁄erentiability of the allocation rule assumed
in that paper.
40is non-decreasing in his current bid ^ ￿is. (Above, (￿ ￿ ^ ￿is)it(~ ￿) denotes bidder i￿ s period-t allocation
under the rule ￿ ￿ ^ ￿is.) Heuristically, this follows from the fact that a higher bid in period s results
in bidder i consuming sooner in the sense that, for any k 2 N, the expected waiting time until he
wins the auction for the k-th time after period s is decreasing in the current bid ^ ￿is. The details for
this last step of the proof are in the Appendix.
The optimal mechanism for selling experience goods is thus essentially a dynamic auction with
memory that grants preferential treatment in each period based on the bids in previous rounds
(under the speci￿cation of Proposition 6, the preferential treatment depends only on the bids in the
￿rst round, but more generally it may depend on all previous bids43). These features are markedly
di⁄erent from running a sequence of second-price auctions with a reserve price, and suggests potential
advantages of building long-term contractual relationships in repeated procurement and sponsored
search.
We now show how the monotonicities in Corollary 2 also permit us to establish the implementabil-
ity of the rules that solve the relaxed program in the buyer-seller examples of Subsection 4.1. In all
these examples, the transition probabilities are independent of past decisions and the kernels satisfy
FOSD, in which case the integral monotonicity conditions can be established by verifying that the
allocation rule ￿ is strongly monotone or satis￿es the weaker requirement of ex-post monotonicity,
which, in the context of these examples, amounts to requiring that, for each state ￿; each period t;





be nondecreasing in the period-t report ^ ￿t. Now recall that, in these examples, the solution to the
relaxed program is given by the rule
￿t (￿) = max
(








for all t ￿ 0;




solutions (which can be guaranteed by picking a su¢ ciently high a > 0 and restricting attention to
distributions F0 whose hazard rate ￿0 (￿0) is bounded away from zero), ex-post monotonicity is then
implied by the following conditions: (a) monotone hazard rate of the ￿rst-period distribution, (b)
@￿t(￿)=@￿t ￿ 0 for all t ￿ 0, all ￿ 2 ￿1, (c) there exists 0 < q < 1=￿ such that jIs￿1;s (￿s)j ￿ q for
all s ￿ 1; all ￿s, and (d) @￿s (￿)=@￿t ￿ ￿
1￿q￿
￿ @￿t(￿)=@￿t for all t ￿ 0, s > t, all ￿ 2 ￿1.
In particular, when the type evolves according to the non-linear AR process of Example 9,
then Is￿1;s (￿s) = ￿0 (￿s￿1) where ￿(￿) is an increasing di⁄erentiable function with ￿(0) = 0 and
43Board (2007) and Eso and Szentes (2007) consider a related auction problem with dynamic information but where
there is a single good on sale and where the evolution of the agents￿information does not depend on past decisions.
41￿(1) < 1. Thus @￿t(￿)=@￿t ￿ 1 at an interior solution. Now, to rule out corner solutions, assume
that ￿0 (￿) ￿ 1=a and ￿0 (￿) ￿ 1 for all ￿ 2 (0;1), in which case condition (c) is satis￿ed. Clearly,
when ￿00 (￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿, which means that the impulse responses are nonincreasing, this rule is
strongly monotone, and hence implementable. When, instead, ￿00 (￿) > 0 for some ￿ 2 (0;1), then
strong monotonicity fails, as a higher report in any period t > 0 may imply a lower consumption
in subsequent periods. However, this rule remains implementable as long as the impulse responses
satisfy the condition ￿00 (￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=(￿a) for all ￿. In particular, when ￿00 (￿) 2 [0;(1 ￿ ￿)=(￿a)],
strong monotonicity is violated; however, because of discounting, the reduction in consumption in
each subsequent period s > t triggered by a higher report in period t is outweighed by the increase in
consumption in the current consumption, and ex-post monotonicity still obtains. Similar arguments
can be applied to the processes of Example 8.
As an aside, we note that in settings with multiple agents, one of the advantages of ex-post
monotonicity is that it allows one to construct payments that guarantee that each agent i has
incentives to report truthfully in each period s, even if he knows the entire history ￿s
￿i of the other
agents￿types. These payments can be constructed as in (28) but with the measures ￿i [￿]j￿t￿1;￿it
replaced by the measure ￿j￿t, which is the (exogenous) process over ￿ according to the kernels F
starting at state ￿t. We then have the following result.
Corollary 3 (Periodic Ex-post IC) Assume that the environment is Markov and satis￿es Con-
ditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BIR, and F-AUT. For any allocation rule ￿ satisfying ex-post monotonicity,
one can construct payments ￿ spreadable over time such that, in each period s ￿ 0, each agent
i = 1;:::;N ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully when he knows the other agents report truthfully,
regardless of his beliefs about the other agents￿type history ￿s
￿i.
In other words, the Corollary ensures that the allocation rule ￿ can be implemented in a periodic
ex-post equilibrium, in the sense of Athey and Segal (2007) and Bergemann and Valimaki (2010).
In particular, it implies that strong truthtelling can be sustained as a PBE of the direct mechanism
even if all the reports and allocations are made public.
Remark 2 With a ￿nite horizon T, the result in Corollary 3 can be strengthened further, ensuring
incentive compatibility even if each agent could ￿nd out about the other agents￿future types ￿a
property that might be called ￿other-ex-post incentive compatibility￿ . This is achieved by making
all the payments after period T, with payments as in (28) but using the measures ￿ij￿t
i;￿T
￿i, which
put probability 1 on the other agents￿realized types ￿T
￿i and consider the evolution of agent i￿ s type
according to his kernels. Furthermore, the same arguments used to establish Proposition 5 imply
that the payments that ensure other-ex-post incentive compatibility are unique, up to a constant.
(With in￿nite horizon, where transfers must be spread over time, ensuring other-ex-post incentive
compatibility seems more di¢ cult.) \\
42Primitive Conditions for Strong Monotonicity We now contribute some primitive conditions
that guarantee that the solution to the Relaxed Program is strongly monotone (and hence PBE
implementable, when applied to a Markov setting).
Condition 10 (U-COMP) Utility Complementarity: X is a lattice,44 and for each i = 0;:::;N,
￿ 2 ￿; Ui (￿;x) is supermodular in x, and for all i = 1;:::;N; all t ￿ 0, ￿@Ui (￿;x)=@￿it is super-
modular in x.
Condition 11 (U-DSEP) Utility Decision-separable: X =
Q1
t=0 Xt and, for all i = 0;:::;N, all







Observe that when F-AUT and U-DSEP hold, i.e., when types evolve independently of the
decisions and payo⁄s are separable in the decisions, the expected virtual surplus can be maximized
separately for all periods and states, obviating the need to solve a dynamic programming problem.





























We then have the following result (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 7 (Primitive Conditions for Strong Monotonicity) Assume that conditions F-
AUT and F-FOSD hold, that, for any i = 0;:::;N, t ￿ 0; Xit is a subset of an Euclidean space, that
an allocation rule maximizing expected dynamic virtual surplus exists, and that either of the following
conditions holds:










has increasing di⁄erences (ID) in (￿;x), and the same is true of the principal￿ s utility U0 (x;￿), or
(b) U-DSEP holds, and for each agent i = 1;:::;N, each t ￿ 0, Xit ￿ R, and there exists a
nondecreasing function ’it : ￿t




























the principal￿ s ￿ow utility depends only on xt.
Then the Relaxed Program has a solution in which for all i = 1;:::;N, ￿i (￿i;￿￿i) is nondecreasing
in ￿i for any ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i:
44The assumption that X is a lattice is not innocuous when N > 1: For example, it holds when each xt describes
the provision of a one-dimensional public good, but it need not hold if xt describes the allocation of a private good.
43Let us discuss the meaning of the proposition, for simplicity starting with the case where U-DSEP
holds and Xt is one-dimensional (so that either case (a) or case (b) in the proposition can be applied).
As in static settings, the key assumption that ensures the monotonicity of the solution to the relaxed
program is that each agent￿ s virtual utility have increasing di⁄erences (ID) in consumption and types.
The di⁄erence from the static settings lies in how this increasing di⁄erence condition could be ensured.
Namely, in a static setting, as well as in the initial period t = 0 of the dynamic setting, it su¢ ces
to assume that period-0 utility ui0(￿0;x0) has ID in consumption and types for any i = 0;:::;N,
and that the partials ￿@ui0 (￿0;x0)=@￿i0 for each i = 1;:::;N have ID (which is a third-derivative
condition on the utility function), and that the hazard rates ￿i0(￿i0) are nondecreasing. However,
to ensure ID of virtual values in periods t ￿ 1 in the dynamic setting, in addition to extending the
previous assumptions to future utility ￿ ows, one also needs to add the assumption that the impulse
responses Ii￿(￿￿
i ) are nondecreasing in types. Indeed, those assumptions together ensure that the






=@￿it has ID in consumption
and types. Intuitively, nondecreasing impulse responses serve to ensure that higher types receive
lower distortions, which helps ensure strong monotonicity of the solution to the relaxed program.
With multidimensional allocations, it no longer su¢ ces to ensure that virtual utilities have in-
creasing di⁄erences in (x;￿): In addition, one needs to ensure that this direct e⁄ect is not outweighed
by the interactions across di⁄erent allocation dimensions, both across periods for a given agent (as in
a dynamic programming problem) and across agents. In case (a) of Proposition 7, all the interactions
are positive by Condition U-COMP. Examples where U-COMP is satis￿ed include (i) provision of a
public good, and (ii) models with ￿learning by doing￿where ui(￿i;xi) is strictly supermodular in xi,
e.g. through a cost complementarity. On the other hand, U-COMP is not satis￿ed when the problem
is to allocate private goods in limited supply (as in auctions), which creates negative interactions
across agents. To deal with such situations, case (b) of Proposition 7 assumes separability across
periods (U-DSEP) and uses the ￿aggregation method￿to ensure that each agent￿ s consumption is
nondecreasing in his own type. This method requires that payo⁄s depend only on the components
of the allocation that are observable to the agents, xit; and that values are private. Given these
assumptions, the functions ’it then capture the aspects of ￿t
i that are relevant for agent i￿ s payo⁄.
The aggregation assumption then ensures that a given increase in ￿t
i either increases all di⁄erences
from xit to x0
it ￿by increasing the aggregator ’it ￿or keeps them all constant. (Without this extra
assumption, we could have a problem selecting one maximizer out of many ￿ e.g. we can always
select the maximizer so that ￿i is nondecreasing in ￿i for any given i, but it might be impossible to
￿nd a selection for which this monotonicity holds for all i.)
445.3 Non-Markov Environments
We conclude by discussing su¢ ciency in non-Markov environments. The di¢ culty there stems from
the fact that an agent who deviated in the past may continue to do so in subsequent periods.
Without knowing how the agent will behave following a deviation, it is hard to identify conditions
that guarantee the suboptimality of deviations in the ￿rst place.45 This explains why general results
for non-Markov environments are hard (if not impossible) to obtain. However, there are a few special
non-Markov settings, of interest for applications, where su¢ ciency can be established.
First, there are environments whose primitives are not Markov, but where each agent i￿ s payo⁄
depends on the history of received signals ￿t
i only through a summary statistics ’it(￿t
i) whose evolution
is Markov and which enters into i￿ s payo⁄ in a Markov way. As far as agent i￿ s incentives are
concerned, one may then simply rede￿ne his type to be ’it(￿t
i) and apply Theorem 2 and its corollaries
to the Markovised environment. An example is provided by the Normal-learning foundations for our
bandit auction applications discussed at the end of Section 2.1. If the signals si are taken as primitives
(i.e., as types), then the model is not Markov. However, each agent i￿ s period-t payo⁄ depends only
on his posterior expectation ￿it of his unknown true valuation which can be shown to follow a Markov
process by routine projection results.
Second, our su¢ ciency results readily extend to a class of time-separable non-Markov environ-
ments. In particular, consider the following family of models that can ￿t many applications, including
sequential auctions, procurement, and regulation. The two key assumptions are that payo⁄s and de-
cisions separate over time and that impulse responses depend only on current and initial types and
are nonincreasing in (￿i0;￿it). Formally, assume that X =
Q1
t=1 Xt with each Xt ￿ RN+1; and
that payo⁄s satisfy Condition U-SPR with ￿ ow payo⁄s uit (￿it;xit) di⁄erentiable in ￿it with partial
derivative @uit(￿it;xit)=@￿it positive, bounded uniformly by a constant Ki > 0; strictly increasing
in xit; and strictly submodular in (￿it;xit); for any i = 1;:::;N; any t ￿ 0. For i = 0 (i.e., for the
principal), simply assume that U0 (￿;x) =
1 X
t=0
￿tu0t(xt): As for the stochastic processes, assume that
they satisfy F-BE, F-BIR, F-AUT and F-FOSD. In addition, assume that ￿rst-period hazard rates
￿i0 (￿i0) are nondecreasing and that, for any i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0; the impulse responses Iit(￿t
i) depend
only on (￿i0;￿it) and are nonincreasing in (￿i0;￿it):
An example of such processes is when the agents￿types follow an AR(k) process, as in Example
3, with impulse responses and shock terms satisfying kIik;kE[j~ "ij]k < 1, all i = 1;:::;N (more
generally, note that any ARIMA process satis￿es the above property). Notice that the processes
45To bypass this di¢ culty, Townsend (1982) suggested mechanisms where at each period each agent is asked to report
his complete ￿signal history￿rather than just the latest signal, as in Myerson (1986). With each report, an agent is
then given a chance to ￿correct￿his past lies, in which case restricting attention to strong truthtelling is always without
loss of generality. Since this approach entails multidimensional reports in each period, it is, however, not clear that it
helps verifying incentive compatibility.
45are not restricted to be Markov and that the environment satis￿es the conditions in part (b) of
Proposition 7, with the functions ’ given by ’it(￿t
i) = (￿i0;￿it) all i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0. We then have
the following result (proof in the Appendix):
Proposition 8 (Separable Environments - Optimal Mechanism) Consider the separable en-
vironment described above and assume that the relaxed program admits a solution.46 Then there
exists an optimal choice rule (￿;￿) such that:
(a) the allocation rule ￿ is strongly monotone, with ￿t(￿t) depending only on (￿0;￿t) all t ￿ 0,
￿t 2 ￿t; and satisfying, for all t ￿ 0; ￿-almost all ￿t,















(b) the payments ￿ are spread over time with





dr all t ￿ 1 (36)
and
 i0(￿0) = ￿E￿j￿0
"


















(c) reporting truthfully at all histories is a periodic ex-post equilibrium.
We conclude by discussing possible implementations of the pro￿t-maximizing rule. First, consider
the special case where ￿ ow payo⁄s are linear (i.e., uit(￿it;xit) = ￿itxit) as in auctions, and where
types evolve according to an AR(k) process (or, more generally, any process for which the impulse
responses Iit depend only on the initial types). The implementation is then particularly simple.
Suppose that there is no allocation in the ￿rst period and assume that the agents do not observe the
other agents￿types (both assumptions simplify the discussion but are not essential for the argument).
In period zero, each agent i is then asked to choose from a menu of ￿handicaps￿(Iit(￿i0)=￿i0 (￿i0))1
t=1,
indexed by ￿i0; with each handicap costing  i0(￿i0); where  i0(￿i0) is as in (37) but with the measure
￿j￿0 replaced by the measure ￿ij￿i0. Then in each period t ￿ 1, a ￿handicapped￿VCG mechanism
is played with transfers as in (36). (Eso and Szentes (2007) derive this result in the special case of a
two-period model with allocation only in the second period.)
This logic extends to nonlinear payo⁄s and more general processes, in the sense that in the ￿rst
period the agents still choose from a menu of future plans (indexed by the ￿rst-period type). However,
in general, in the subsequent periods the distortions will depend also on the current reports through
46This can be ensured, for example, by assuming that, for all t ￿ 0; Xt is compact and that, for all ￿; all t ￿ 0; uit,
i = 0;::;N; are continuous over Xt.
46the partial derivatives @uit(￿it;xit)=@￿it and through the impulse responses Iit(￿i0;￿it). However, as
long as payo⁄separate over time and the impulse responses depend only on initial and current types,
the intermediate reports (i.e., reports in periods 1;:::;t ￿ 1) remain irrelevant both for the period-t
allocation and for the period-t payments.
Finally, note that the logic we use in the Appendix to establish su¢ ciency in this family of
non-Markov problems ("virtual" VCG payments in each period t > 0 along with monotonicity of
the allocation rule and payments at t = 0 given by (37)) extends to a few environments where
payo⁄s are not time-separable, but where virtual payo⁄s continue to be an a¢ ne transformation of
the true payo⁄s with constants that depend only on the initial reports. Consider, for example, an
economy where all processes are AR(1) and where payo⁄s are given by Ui =
P1
t=0 ￿t￿itxit ￿ cit(xt);
all i = 0;:::;N: The dynamic virtual surplus then coincides with the true surplus of a ￿ctitious
economy where all agents￿payo⁄s are as in the original economy and where the principal￿ s payo⁄ is






t=0 ￿tIitxit: Then note that, irrespective of whether or not the agents
reported truthfully in period zero, the allocation rule ￿ that solves the relaxed program maximizes
the surplus of this ￿ctitious economy from period t = 1 onwards. This property, together with the
fact that values are private from t = 1 onwards in this ￿ctitious economy, then implies that incentives
for truthful reporting at any period t ￿ 1 can be provided by using either the team payments of
Athey and Segal (2007) or the pivot payments of Bergemann and V￿lim￿ki (2010). Furthermore, as
long as the rule ￿ satis￿es average monotone in the initial reports ￿0, then incentives can also be
provided in period 0 by adding to the aforementioned payments an initial payment given by (37).
For an application of similar ideas to a family of problems where the dynamic virtual surplus takes
the form of a multiplicative transformation of the true surplus, with the scale depending only on the
initial reports, see the recent paper by Kakade et al. (2011).
6 Conclusions
We studied the design of optimal mechanisms in fairly rich dynamic settings. The generality of
the model served two purposes. First, it permitted us to unify the existing literature, identifying
general principles and highlighting what drives similarities and di⁄erences in the special cases con-
sidered. Second, it o⁄ered a ￿ exibility that facilitates novel applications, such as the design of sales
mechanisms for the provision of new experience goods, as in our leading bandit-auctions application.
The core of the analysis is a formula that describes how equilibrium payo⁄s respond to the arrival
of new information. We identi￿ed primitive conditions that validate this formula as a necessary
condition for incentive compatibility in any Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanism. We then
showed how to construct payments that guarantee that this formula is satis￿ed at any information
set, which is necessary for implementability under solution concepts such as PBE. We also quali￿ed
47in what sense such payments are essentially pinned down by the allocation rule, thus extending the
celebrated ￿revenue equivalence￿result to the dynamic setting.
Next, we showed how optimal mechanisms can be obtained by ￿rst solving a relaxed program
that uses only the ￿rst-order necessary conditions for incentive compatibility at the initial contract-
ing stage and then verifying that the solution to this program is ￿globally￿incentive compatible.
We showed how, in Markov settings, this last step consists in checking that the allocation rule is
su¢ ciently monotone, in a sense that re￿ ects the multi-dimensional nature of the dynamic problem
and uses the same envelope formulae that de￿ne the necessary conditions.
Throughout the entire analysis, we maintained the assumption that the agents are time-consistent.
Relaxing this assumption is challenging and represents an interesting line for future research (For
some preliminary work in this direction, see Galperti (2011)).
Appendix




Cit("i) for all i;t;￿0, with kCi ("i)k < 1, and kZi (￿i0; ^ ￿i (￿i0;￿￿i;0;");"i)k < 1, which under
Conditions F-BE0, F-BIR0 occurs with probability 1, and temporarily drop arguments "; ￿￿i;0, ^ ￿i0,
x = ^ ￿(^ ￿i0;￿￿i;0;"), and i to simplify notation.




























U (Z (￿0 + h)) as T ! 1










and the right-hand side converges to zero as T ! 1 since kCk < 1.































t (￿0) as T ! 1


























￿T (￿0;h) = 0:
This yields (putting back all the missing arguments)


























Next, note that, being a composition of Lipschitz continuous functions, ^ Ui(^ ￿i0;￿;￿￿i;0;") is equi-
Lipschitz continuous in ￿i0 with constant AkCi (")k. Since, by F-BIR0, E[kCi (~ ")k] < 1, by the


















































is di⁄erentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous in ￿i0, with the Lipschitz
constant AE[kCi (~ ")k], and with derivative at ￿i0 = ^ ￿i0 given by the formula in the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4. For part (i), we show that each of the three terms in  it has




2 ￿s￿1 ￿ ￿is (which also implies that the series in (28) converges with probability 1



















where Ai > 0 is the constant of equi-Lipschitz continuity of the utility function, and where Bi > 0 is
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it







Hence, this term has a ￿nite EPV under Condition F-BE and jj￿0
ijj < 1. For the second term, using












49which is ￿nite by Condition F-BE and jj￿0
ijj < 1. Finally, for the third term, note that this has a
￿nite EPV because of Conditions U-SPR and F-BE.
For part (ii), write the time-s equilibrium expected payo⁄ (23) given history ￿s￿1;￿is using
Fubini￿ s Theorem and the Law of Iterated Expectations as
V
h￿;￿i;￿













































(the expectations of the other terms for t ￿ s cancel out by the Law of Iterated Expectations). Note
that the second line is independent of ￿is, and that the last limit equals zero by (41), Condition
F-BE, and jj￿0






is Lipschitz continuous in






, which is the right-hand side of (26).
Proof of Proposition 5. We start by considering a single-agent environment and then extend
the result to a setting with multiple agents under the no-leakage condition.
First consider the single-agent case, where beliefs are vacuous, and omit the agent index for the





implementing the same allocation rule ￿, any s ￿ 0; ￿s 2 ￿s, we can write
V h￿;￿i


















= V h￿;￿ ￿i
s (￿s) ￿ V h￿;￿ ￿i
s￿1 (￿s￿1):






























Now, when the payments can be spread over time, one can also verify that the following property
holds.
Lemma A1 Suppose that the payment rule ￿ can be spread over time. Then, as T ! 1, for
































































Since E￿[￿]j￿0[jj (~ ￿)jj] < 1, the last expectation goes to zero as T ! 1, which implies the result. ￿
Thus, when both payment rules ￿ ￿ and ￿ can be spread over time, we have that
￿(￿) ￿ ￿ ￿(￿) = K for ￿[￿]￿ almost all ￿:
Now, to see how the arguments above extend to settings with multiple agents under the no-leakage
condition, observe that when on-path IC holds for agent i, then it must also hold in the ￿blind￿setting
in which agent i is not shown xi. (Indeed, the set of agent i￿ s contingent reporting plans in the blind
settings is a subset of those in the original setting, but still includes truthtelling.) Furthermore, if
the allocation rule ￿ leaks no information to agent i, then we can interpret the ￿blind￿setting as a
single-agent setting in which agent i￿ s allocation in period t is simply his report ^ ￿it, and his utility is
^ Ui(￿i;^ ￿i) = E￿i[￿]j^ ￿i
h
Ui(￿i;~ ￿￿i;￿(^ ￿i;~ ￿￿i))
i
, where ￿i [￿]j^ ￿i denotes the probability measure over the
other agents￿types when agent i￿ s reports are ￿xed at ^ ￿i. (Intuitively, the other agents￿types can
be viewed as being realized only after agent i has ￿nished reporting, and ^ Ui is the expectation taken
over such realizations.) Applying to this setting the result established above for the single-agent case,






is pinned down, up to a constant, by
the allocation rule ￿ with probability 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. First note that, because the environment is Markov and the original
rule satis￿es ICFOCi;t+1 with accompanying beliefs ￿; the new rule
D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
clearly satis￿es
ICFOCi;t+1 (indeed, because the environment is Markov, the satisfaction of ICFOCi;t+1 does not
depend on whether or not ￿it = ^ ￿it).
Below, we show that the fact that
D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
satis￿es ICFOCi;t+1 along with the fact
that the environment is Markov also imply that the same rule satis￿es ICFOCi;t under the same
accompanying beliefs ￿. To see this, simplify the notation by letting ^ ￿ = ￿￿^ ￿it and ^ ￿ = ￿￿^ ￿it: Then
￿x ￿t￿1 and let ~ ￿
t￿1







. Then use the kernel Fjt(￿t￿1
j ;￿t￿1
j (￿t￿1))
to draw ~ ￿jt for each j 6= i, to obtain ￿t
￿i. Given agent i￿ s beliefs over ~ ￿
t
￿i, we can then use the state
representation along with the law of iterated expectations to represent the agent￿ s expected payo⁄
as





























51To di⁄erentiate the expression inside the expectation with respect to ￿it, use the chain rule and
the property that
D
^ ￿; ^ ￿
E
































































For the ￿rst term in (45), note that since the environment is Markov and
D
^ ￿; ^ ￿
E
does not depend
on ￿it, we have that









































Now, the Dominated Convergence Theorem allows us to di⁄erentiate (44) with respect to ￿it since all
the functions being di⁄erentiated are equi-Lipschitz continuous in (￿i;t+1;￿t
￿i ) by U-ELC, ICFOCi;t+1
and F-BIR. Doing this di⁄erentiation and using (25) and the above chain formula yields


























i ; ^ ￿￿￿1
i (~ ￿)























. Using also the fact that Ii;(t);t = 1, the above formula yields ICFOCi;t for the rule D
^ ￿; ^ ￿
E
with accompanying beliefs ￿:
Proof of Lemma 5. We start with the following result:
Lemma A2 Assume that the environment is Markov. Let h￿;￿i be a choice rule where the




￿ Kit for all t ￿ 0, with kKik < 1, and (ii)
￿ ￿ it
￿
￿t￿￿ ￿ ￿ L
 
i j￿itj + M
 





i jj < 1. Then if one-stage deviations from strong truthtelling are not pro￿table at any
information set, arbitrary deviations from strong truthtelling are not pro￿table at any information
set.
52Intuitively, bound (i) on the payments ensures that for any possible deviation strategy, the net
present value of the payments received by the agent from period T onward is either small or negative
when T is large. Bound (ii) together with Condition F-MB from the de￿nition of Markov environ-
ments ensure that if the agent reverts to strong truthtelling in period T, the expected payments
received after the reversion are small in absolute value. Hence, the reversion will not cost the agent
much in terms of expected payments. Under Condition U-MSPR, the same is true for the agent￿ s
expected non-monetary utility. Hence, in considering potential pro￿table deviations from strong
truthtelling, it su¢ ces to check only those deviations that revert to strong truthtelling at some ￿nite
period T.
Proof of Lemma A2. The usual backward-induction argument establishes that, if no one-
step deviation from strong truthtelling is pro￿table, then an agent￿ s expected payo⁄ at any history
can never be increased by any ￿nite-stage deviation from strong truthtelling. To establish that
in￿nite-stage deviations are also unpro￿table, suppose in negation that there exists an agent i and a








(not necessarily truthful for agent i) such that agent i raises
his expected payo⁄ at his by some " > 0 by deviating from strong truthtelling to some strategy ^ ￿i,
assuming that all other agents report truthfully. (All the expectations below will be given history
his:)
We then show that there exists some ￿nite T > s such that reversion from ^ ￿i to strong truthtelling
starting in period T cannot reduce the agent￿ s expected payo⁄ by more than "=2. For this purpose,
note ￿rst that under F-MB, the agent￿ s time-s expectation of his type in each period t ￿ s under
any strategy is bounded as follows:
E[j~ ￿itj] ￿ ￿t￿s
i j￿isj +
Pt
￿=s ￿t￿￿Ei￿ ￿ Sit:
Note that letting Sit ￿ 0 for t < s we have





















Hence, by Condition U-MSPR, the expected present value (EPV) of non-monetary utility ￿ ows
starting in period T under any strategy is bounded in absolute value by
P1
t=T ￿t [LiSit + Mit], and
so reversion from strategy ^ ￿i to strong truthtelling in period T can reduce this EPV by at most twice
this amount. Likewise, condition (ii) on payments implies that the EPV of payment ￿ ows from strong










. As for the
EPV of payment ￿ ows from period T onwards under strategy ^ ￿i, by condition (i) it is bounded from
above by
P1
t=T ￿tKit. Adding up, we see that the total expected loss due to the reversion in period


















i jj;kKik < 1, the loss converges to zero as T ! 1, and so it falls
below "=2 for some T large enough. But then the ￿nite-stage deviation to ^ ￿i between periods s and
T is pro￿table, which contradicts the ￿rst statement of the proof. ￿
We ￿nish the proof of Lemma 5 by showing that the payment rule given by (28) satis￿es conditions
(i) and (ii) of Lemma A2. This is done by establishing the bounds for each of the three terms in
(28).
We begin with condition (ii). The ￿rst term in (28) satis￿es this bound by (41) and jj^ ￿ijj < 1.



































which satis￿es the bound since jjEijj;jj^ ￿ijj < 1. The third term satis￿es the bound by Condition
U-MSPR.
Next, we turn to condition (i). Using (27) and the fact that the payments (28) satisfy ICFOC


























































Now, the assumption that no agent has a pro￿table one-step deviation from strong truthtelling
implies in particular that, given true history (￿t￿1;^ ￿it); agent i does not gain by reporting ￿it, followed
by strong truthtelling, or























54where we have used the fact that in a Markov environment, once ~ ￿i;t+1 is realized following the mis-
report, the only payo⁄e⁄ect of the past true type being ^ ￿it rather than ￿it is through period-t utility.
Using this inequality, and also noting that the distribution of ~ ￿
t
￿i under the probability measure
￿i [￿;￿]j￿t￿1;￿it does not depend on ￿it, so we can replace the measure in (47) with ￿i [￿;￿]j￿t￿1;^ ￿it,













































and note that both terms on the right are bounded above by a term of a ￿nite-norm sequence: the
￿rst term by (46) and jjEijj;jj^ ￿ijj < 1, and the second term by Condition U-MSPR and jj^ ￿ijj < 1.
Proof of Proposition 6￿ continued. As noted in the text, it su¢ ces to verify that the
virtual index policy de￿ned by (18) satis￿es average monotonicity, i.e., for all i = 1;:::;N, s ￿ 0,





￿t(￿ ￿ ^ ￿is)it(~ ￿)
#
is nondecreasing in ^ ￿is. We show this for s = 0. The argument for s > 0 is analogous but simpler
since ^ ￿is does not a⁄ect bidder i￿ s handicap when s > 0.




k=1 Ri(￿jk) for each i, independently across i = 1;:::;N, and draw initial
types ￿i0 according to Fi0 independently of the innovations !i and across i. Letting Kt ￿
Pt
￿=1 x￿,
bidder i￿ s type in period t can then be described as




Given that this representation generates the same conditional distributions (and hence the same
process) as the kernels de￿ned in the main text, it is straightforward to verify that it is a valid state
representation.
Next, ￿x an arbitrary bidder i = 1;:::;N and a state (￿0;!) 2 ￿0 ￿ (RN)1, and take a pair
￿0
i0;￿00
i0 2 ￿0 with ￿
00
i0 > ￿0
i0. We show by induction on k that, for any k 2 N, the k-th time that i
wins the object if he initially reports ￿00
i0 (and reports truthfully in each period t > 0) comes weakly
earlier than if he reports ￿0
i0. As the realization (￿0;!) 2 ￿0 ￿ (RN)1 is arbitrary, this implies that
55the expected time to the k-th win is decreasing in the initial report, which in turn implies that the
virtual policy ￿ satis￿es average monotonicity.
As a preliminary observation, note that the period-t virtual index of bidder i is increasing in the
(reported) period-0 type ￿i0 since the handicap is decreasing in ￿i0, and (in case t = 0) E￿[￿ ￿i]j￿i0[￿i￿]
is increasing in ￿i0 for all ￿ ￿ 0.
Base case: Suppose, towards a contradiction, that the ￿rst win given initial report ￿0
i0 comes in
period t0 whereas it comes in period t00 > t0 given report ￿
00
i0 > ￿0
i0. As the realization (￿0;!) is ￿xed,
the virtual indices of bidders ￿i in period t0 are the same in both cases. But ￿it0((￿00
i0;￿i0;:::;￿i0);0) >
￿it0((￿0
i0;￿i0;:::;￿i0);0), implying that i must win in period t0 also with initial report ￿00
i0, which
contradicts t00 > t0.
Induction step: Suppose the claim is true for some k ￿ 1. Suppose towards contradiction that
the k+1-th win given report ￿0




Then observe that (i) In both cases, i wins the auction k ￿ 1 times prior to period t0. Furthermore,
since the realization (￿0;!) is ￿xed, this implies that (ii) bidder i￿ s current type ￿it is the same in
both cases, and (iii) the number of times each bidder j 6= i wins the object prior to period t0 is the
same in both cases, and hence the virtual indices of bidders ￿i in period t0 are the same in both
cases. By (i) and (ii) i￿ s virtual index in period t0 is identical in both cases except for the initial
report. That bidder i￿ s period-t0 index is increasing in the initial report, along with (iii) implies that
i must then win in period t0 also with initial report ￿00
i0, contradicting t00 > t0. Hence the claim is
true for k + 1.
Proof of Proposition 7. Case (a): We construct a nondecreasing solution ￿s (￿) sequentially
for s = 0;1:::. Suppose we have a solution ￿ in which ￿s￿1 (￿) is nondecreasing. Consider the
problem of choosing the optimal continuation allocation rule in period s given type history ￿s and
allocation history ￿s￿1 ￿
￿s￿1￿
. Using the state representation (24) from period s onward, we can
write the continuation rule for t ￿ s as a collection of functions ^ ￿t (") of the shocks ".
First, note that, because X is a sublattice,
Q
t￿s
Xt is a lattice. This means that the set of feasible
shock-contingent plans ^ ￿ is also a lattice under pointwise meet and join operations (i.e. for each ").



















is supermodular in x￿s and has ID in
￿
￿s;x￿s￿
(observe that Zs (￿s;") is nondecreasing in ￿s under F-
FOSD, and ￿s￿1 ￿
￿s￿1￿
is nondecreasing in ￿s￿1 by construction). Therefore, adding up over agents
and taking expectation over ", we obtain that the expected virtual surplus starting with period-s
history ￿s is supermodular in the continuation plan ^ ￿ and has ID in (￿s; ^ ￿). Topkis￿ s Theorem then
implies that the set of optimal continuation plans is nondecreasing in ￿s in the strong set order. In
56particular, focus on the ￿rst component ￿s 2 Xs of such plans. By Theorem 2 of Kukushkin (2009),
there exists a nondecreasing selection of optimal values, ^ ￿s (￿s). Therefore, the relaxed program




; ^ ￿s (￿s)
￿
is nondecreasing in ￿s.




, one for each t; with each ￿t
￿
￿t￿
satisfying the optimality condition (34) for all ￿t. For any t, we
can then choose ￿t
￿
￿t￿




























Now ￿x any i ￿ 1 and for any xit 2 Xit; let Xt (xit) ￿ fx0
t 2 Xt : x0
it = xitg. The optimality condition
(34) implies that
￿ ￿it (’t) 2 arg max
xit2Xit
￿
































has strict ID in (’it;xit), by the Monotone Selection Theorem of













Proof of Proposition 8. First note that, because the environment is time-separable, an
allocation rule ￿ maximizes the dynamic virtual surplus￿ and hence solves the relaxed program￿ if
and only if for all t ￿ 0; ￿-almost all ￿t 2 ￿t; ￿t(￿t) satis￿es (35). Furthermore, it is easy to see that
there exists a solution to the relaxed program that is strongly monotone47 and such that for all t ￿ 0,
all ￿t 2 ￿t; ￿t(￿t) depends only on (￿0;￿t). To see that the proposed payments implement this rule
and satisfy properties (b) and (c) in the proposition, then note that, under the proposed mechanism,
incentives separate over time, starting from t = 1 onwards. That is, in each period t ￿ 1, and for any
history, each agent maximizes his payo⁄ by simply choosing the current message so as to maximize
his ￿ ow payo⁄ uit +  it. This follows from the fact, at any t ￿ 1, each agent i￿ s message mit has
no direct e⁄ect on the allocations in periods ￿ > t and, because the environment is time-separable,
the allocation in period t has no direct e⁄ect on the future ￿ ow payo⁄s. That, given the proposed
payments, the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully, irrespective of his beliefs about the other
agents￿types and messages, and irrespective of whether or not he has been truthful in the past,
then follows from standard results from static mechanism design by observing that (i) the allocation
￿it(￿0;￿t) is monotone in ￿it, for all (￿￿i;t;￿0); and (ii) that values are private., i.e., each uit depends
only on own ￿it: In other words, it is as if each agent i were facing a single-agent static decision
problem indexed by (￿￿i;t;￿0): In particular, note that reporting truthfully remains optimal even if
47This can be seen by applying Proposition 7 to the setting under examination here.
57each agent were able to observe both his own future types, the other agents￿past, current, and future
types, and the messages sent by the other agents, thus making his beliefs completely irrelevant.
As for period zero, the optimality of truthtelling follows from Lemma A3 below along with the
fact that the allocation rule is strongly monotone, which means that conditions (48) trivially hold.48
Lemma A3 Suppose that Conditions U-D, U-ELC, F-BE, and F-BIR hold, and consider a choice
rule h￿;￿i with accompanying system of beliefs ￿. Suppose that (i) the choice rule satis￿es ICFOC t,










￿it ￿ ^ ￿it
￿
￿ 0; (48)
where the functions D are as de￿ned in (27), and (iii) strong truthtelling is optimal at all period-
(t+1) histories (including non-truthful ones). Then, for all agents, a one-step deviation from strong
truthtelling is not pro￿table at any period-t truthful history.
Proof of Lemma A3. The result follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem
2 in the main text. Simply observe that, for each agent i; any report ^ ￿it 2 ￿it; the choice rule D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
that is obtained from h￿;￿i by ignoring agent i￿ s report ￿it and replacing it with
^ ￿it is on-path BIC for agent i in period t (this follows from the fact that truthful reporting is optimal
at any future history). By Proposition 3, we then have that the choice rule
D
￿ ￿ ^ ￿it;￿ ￿ ^ ￿it
E
must
satisfy ICFOCi;t. The suboptimality of one-stage deviations from truthtelling in period t then follows
from the fact that the single-crossing conditions (48) imply the integral monotonicity conditions.￿
Given the result in the lemma, that, in period 0, the agent ￿nds it optimal to report truthfully
irrespective of his beliefs about the other agents￿types follows from the fact that truthful reporting
is optimal for each ￿￿i;0: Together with the fact that truthful reporting is also optimal in each
subsequent period irrespective of the beliefs, this establish that the proposed payments implement
the allocation rule as a periodic ex-post equilibrium.49
Finally, because each uit(￿it;xit) is nondecreasing in ￿it; it is immediate to verify that, under the
proposed mechanism, participating is optimal for all period-0 types.
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63List of Conditions
Conditions on utilities:




(U-ELC) Utility Equi-Lipschitz Continuous: For each i = 1;:::;N, the function family fUi (￿;￿￿i;x)g￿￿i2￿￿i;x2X
is equi-Lipschitz continuous on ￿i￿. I.e., there exists Ai < 1 such that for all ￿i;￿0












(U-SPR) Utility Spreadable: For all i = 1;:::;N, there exists a sequence of functions
￿
uit : ￿t ￿ Xt ! R
￿1
t=0
and constants Li and (Mit)1











￿ ￿ Lij￿itj + Mit:
(U-MSPR) Utility Markov Spreadable: Utility is spreadable with each function uit depending on ￿t
i only





(U-COMP) Utility Complementarity: X is a lattice, and for each i = 0;:::;N, ￿ 2 ￿; Ui (￿;x) is
supermodular in x, and for all i = 1;:::;N; all t ￿ 0, ￿@Ui (￿;x)=@￿it is supermodular in x.
(U-DSEP) Utility Decision-separable: X =
Q1








Conditions on type processes:
(F-BE0) Process Bounded in Expectation at time 0: For each i = 1;:::;N, ￿i0 2 ￿i0; and ￿ 2 X;
E￿i[￿]j￿i0[jj~ ￿ijj] < 1.
(F-BE) Process Bounded in Expectation: For any i = 1;:::;N; t ￿ 0, (￿t￿1;￿it) 2 ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿it; ￿ 2 X;





(F-BIR0) Process Bounded Impulse Responses at t = 0. The kernels F admit a state representation with
the following property: For each i = 1;:::;N, de￿ne the functions
￿

























￿=0 : For each ￿i0 2 ￿i0, t ￿ 0, xi 2 Xi, "t
i 2
Et
i; the derivative @Zit(￿i0;xt￿1
i ;"t
i)=@￿i0 exists and is bounded in absolute value by Cit ("i), where
E[jjCi (~ "i)jj] < 1 for all ￿i0.
64(F-BIR) Process Bounded Impulse Responses: The kernels F admit a state representation hE;G;zi with the
































￿=0 : For each i = 1;:::;N; s ￿ 0; t ￿ s; ￿s
i 2 ￿s
i,
xi 2 Xi, "i 2 Ei the derivative @Zi;(s);t(￿s
i;xt￿1
i ;"t
i)=@￿is exists and is bounded in absolute value by
Ci;(s);t￿s ("i), where E[jjCi;(s) (~ "i)jj] ￿ Bi < 1.
(F-MB) Process Markov Bounded: For each i = 1;:::;N, and any t ￿ 2, xt￿1
i 2 Xt￿1







does not depend on ￿t￿2





), and there exists
constant ￿i and (Eit)1












￿ ￿i j￿itj + Ei;t+1.









is nonincreasing in ￿t￿1
i .
(F-AUT) Process Decision-Autonomous: For all i = 1;:::;N, t ￿ 1, ￿t￿1
i 2 ￿t￿1







does not depend on xt￿1
i .
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